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Financing of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017

Report of the Secretary-General

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Summary

The present report contains the proposed budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, which amounts to $346,926,700.

The proposed budget in the amount of $346,926,700 represents a decrease of $33,429,000, or 8.8 per cent, compared with the appropriation of $380,355,700 for the 2015/16 period. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to the proposed abolishment of national and international posts, as well as United Nations Volunteer positions, as part of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission.

The budget provides for the deployment of 2,370 military contingent personnel, 951 United Nations police officers, 1,600 formed police units personnel, 320 international staff, 932 national staff, 94 United Nations Volunteers and 50 Government-provided personnel.

The total resource requirements for MINUSTAH for the financial period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 have been linked to the objective of the Mission through a number of results-based frameworks organized according to components (security and stability; democratic governance and State legitimacy; rule of law and human rights; and support). The human resources of the Mission in terms of the number of personnel have been attributed to the individual components, with the exception of the executive direction and management of the Mission, which can be attributed to the Mission as a whole.

The explanations of variances in resource levels, both human resources and financial resources, have been linked, where applicable, to specific outputs planned by the Mission.

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars: budget year is from 1 July to 30 June.)

Category	*Expenditures (2014/15)*	*Apportionment (2015/16)*	*Cost estimates (2016/17)*	*Variance*	
				Amount	*Percentage*
Military and police personnel	251 840.6	173 623.6	174 311.5	687.9	0.4
Civilian personnel	112 076.4	107 775.6	87 132.9	(20 642.7)	(19.2)
Operational costs	109 214.9	98 956.5	85 482.3	(13 474.2)	(13.6)
Gross requirements	**473 131.9**	**380 355.7**	**346 926.7**	**(33 429.0)**	**(8.8)**
Staff assessment income	11 423.8	10 809.3	8 406.5	(2 402.8)	(22.2)
Net requirements	**461 708.1**	**369 546.4**	**338 520.2**	**(31 026.2)**	**(8.4)**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	–	–	–	–	–
Total requirements	**473 131.9**	**380 355.7**	**346 926.7**	**(33 429.0)**	**(8.8)**

Human resources[a]

	Military contingents	*United Nations police*	*Formed police units*	*International staff*	*National staff*[b]	*Temporary position*[c]	*United Nations Volunteers*	*Government-provided personnel*	*Total*
Executive direction and management									
Approved 2015/16	–	–	–	21	18	–	1	–	40
Proposed 2016/17	–	–	–	25	21	–	2	–	48
Components									
Security and stability									
Approved 2015/16	2 370	951	1 600	19	20	–	11	50	5 021
Proposed 2016/17	2 370	951	1 600	24	39	–	16	50	5 050
Democratic governance and State legitimacy									
Approved 2015/16	–	–	–	54	127	–	21	–	202
Proposed 2016/17	–	–	–	37	67	–	5	–	109
Rule of law and human rights									
Approved 2015/16	–	–	–	29	54	–	7	–	90
Proposed 2016/17	–	–	–	27	49	–	7	–	83
Support									
Approved 2015/16	–	–	–	228	836	1	76	–	1 141
Proposed 2016/17	–	–	–	207	756	–	64	–	1 027
Total									
Approved 2015/16	2 370	951	1 600	351	1 055	1	116	50	6 494
Proposed 2016/17	2 370	951	1 600	320	932	–	94	50	6 317
Net change	–	–	–	(31)	(123)	(1)	(22)	–	(177)

[a] Represents highest level of authorized/proposed strength.
[b] Includes National Professional Officers and national General Service staff.
[c] Funded under general temporary assistance.

The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in section IV of the present report.

I. Mandate and planned results

A. Overall

1. The mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1542 (2004). The most recent extension of the mandate was authorized by the Council in its resolution 2243 (2015) of 14 October 2015, by which the Council extended the MINUSTAH mandate until 15 October 2016.

2. The Mission is mandated to help the Security Council achieve an overall objective, namely, to restore peace and security and to further the constitutional and political process in Haiti.

3. Within this overall objective, during the budget period MINUSTAH will contribute to a number of expected accomplishments by delivering the related key outputs shown in the frameworks below. These frameworks are grouped by the following component: security and stability; democratic governance and State legitimacy; rule of law and human rights; and support.

4. The expected accomplishments are aimed at fulfilling the objective of the Security Council within the lifetime of the Mission, and the indicators of achievement show measurements of progress towards the achievement of such accomplishments during the budget period. The human resources of MINUSTAH, in terms of the number of personnel, have been attributed to the individual components, with the exception of the Mission executive direction and management, which can be attributed to the Mission as a whole. Variances in the number of personnel compared to the 2015/16 budget have been explained under the respective components.

B. Planning assumptions and mission support initiatives

5. The publication, by presidential order, of an electoral decree and an electoral calendar in March 2015 set the stage for the holding of long-awaited elections. The elections were expected to further the democratic consolidation of Haiti through a peaceful transfer of power in February 2016. While the elections were partially successful and brought about the installation of the fiftieth legislature on 11 January 2016, the second round of the presidential election was cancelled two days before the scheduled vote on 24 January 2016. A transitory governance arrangement was brokered between the executive and the legislative branches before the end of the President's constitutional mandate on 7 February 2016. The arrangement set out a road map for the election of an interim President and a new government, as well as for the completion of the electoral process and the installation of a new President by 14 May 2016. However, risks that the transitional period will be protracted remain, and the Mission will continue to support the efforts of the Government of Haiti to ensure a continuation of the political process and a swift transfer of power to a democratically elected President. At the same time, the expected completion of the electoral process in a politically volatile environment will continue to test the capacity of all State authorities, including the Haitian National Police. The operating environment of MINUSTAH will be shaped by the manner and the timing within which the electoral process will be completed.

6. In line with Security Council resolution 2243 (2015), a strategic assessment is expected to be conducted after the conclusion of the electoral process and the installation of the new President. The assessment will inform the decision of the Security Council on the future configuration of the United Nations in Haiti beyond 2016. While the civilian footprint of the Mission will be reduced in accordance with the consolidation plan of the Mission, it is considered vital that a United Nations military and police presence be maintained during this critical period of democratic consolidation, with a view to supporting a peaceful political transition.

7. MINUSTAH will continue to support the implementation of the 2012-2016 development plan and the drafting and adoption of a new 2017-2021 strategic plan for the Haitian National Police. The support of the Mission will include: (a) ensuring that financial resources are available for the Haitian National Police to adequately deploy, function and perform throughout the entire territory; (b) ensuring that the police school and police academy have sufficient resources to function effectively and to attract and train new cadets; (c) strengthening internal management systems; and (d) supporting the development of specialized capabilities of the Haitian National Police.

8. With regard to rule of law and human rights, MINUSTAH will partner with local authorities to strengthen the accountability and oversight mechanisms of the independent State bodies, such as the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the Inspector-General of the Haitian National Police and similar institutions. The Mission will continue to support efforts to: establish a fair, independent, credible and functioning judicial system; facilitate the drafting and promulgation of critical laws; and support efforts to improve compliance with signed/ratified international human rights instruments. MINUSTAH will continue to apply the model jurisdictions approach in the areas where it retains its civilian presence. MINUSTAH will also initiate the gradual transfer of the management and implementation of its programmes to other partners, notably through increased partnership with the United Nations country team within the framework of the United Nations joint interim rule-of-law programme (2015-2016).

9. With regard to governance, the Mission intends to facilitate, through the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, dialogue, reconciliation and shuttle diplomacy so as to avoid or to mitigate political disputes between political actors and to prevent such disputes from escalating and obstructing the implementation of democratic processes and the provision of government services. The Mission will also build consensus between the executive branch and Parliament to facilitate the adoption of a legislative agenda, drawing on collaboration with political parties, the private sector and civil society. During this critical time in the consolidation and renewal of democratic institutions in Haiti, MINUSTAH will intensify its efforts to promote political dialogue at the central level among political actors, civil society and the legislative and executive branches of the Government through its good offices functions, in collaboration with other partners, including the United Nations country team and bilateral actors.

10. The Mission will continue to implement its consolidation plan, in line with the objective of the Secretary-General to consolidate the physical and staffing footprint of the Mission without undermining its commitment to the security and stability of Haiti. The recommendations of the civilian staffing review conducted in November 2014 remain valid. The review recommended further efficiencies through the rationalization and streamlining of the substantive functions of the Mission. The operational support requirements of the Mission have been proportionally adjusted

to reflect the substantive disengagement at the regional level. In that context, MINUSTAH will close the regional offices in Gonaïves and the West Department by June 2016. The closure of the two offices, and the abolishment of the posts, which will no longer be needed, will enable the further consolidation of the Mission.

11. To further enhance its effectiveness, and taking into consideration the consolidation and downsizing of the Mission, it is proposed to merge the Institutional Support and Law Reform Section and the Independence and Accountability Section into one new section, which will be named the Accountability, Institutional Support and Law Reform Section. While the tasks and activities performed by the two sections remain critical, the support provided to the Superior Council of the Judiciary and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security are similar in nature and can best be addressed by an integrated section. The proposed structure is premised on the utilization of existing resources in a more effective and efficient manner in order to support the judicial system of the Government of Haiti, including key accountability and oversight mechanisms, government structures and legislative reform. The staffing reductions and movements resulting from the consolidation process are presented under the human resources changes in each component.

12. Support will be delivered on-site from the three support hubs based in Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes and Cap-Haïtien, or by mobile teams. The Mission will retain aviation support to address rapid deployment requirements. It will also continue to explore further opportunities for the consolidation of locations in Port-au-Prince and the possible reduction of sites where police personnel are co-located.

13. External factors that may impede the goals of the Mission range from delays in the establishment of a new government, any substantive change in direction following the strategic assessment to be performed after the holding of the elections or an increase in instability and/or reduced security resulting from delays in establishing the new government.

C. Regional mission cooperation

14. MINUSTAH will collaborate with regional organizations in the implementation of its mandated goals. More specifically, it will consult on a regular basis with the Organization of American States (OAS), through the core group of ambassadors, the Union of South American Nations, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Caribbean Common Market on the further development of the country. In addition, the Mission will work in partnership with OAS and CARICOM to continue to support the high-level, binational dialogue between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

D. Partnerships, country team coordination and integrated missions

15. In close coordination with MINUSTAH, the United Nations country team will continue to play a central role in supporting the development efforts of the Government of Haiti in sectors such as the rule of law, governance, health, education and employment, with specific focus on institutional strengthening and capacity development. Acknowledging the significant changes in the policy environment affecting development and humanitarian operations in Haiti in the past year, the

United Nations, in close collaboration with the Government, has reviewed the integrated strategic framework for the period 2013-2016 for the years 2015 and 2016.

16. As a result of the 2015/16 review, MINUSTAH and the United Nations country team have streamlined their objectives, strengthened monitoring tools and taken new national strategies and updated sources of data and statistics into account, including in key areas such as corrections, border management and support to local governance, with particular focus on the Mission drawdown and on new policies adopted by the Government of Haiti. The revised integrated strategic framework will strengthen the accountability mechanism between the Government and the United Nations presence in Haiti as it identifies roles and responsibilities more clearly. In addition, the United Nations country team has proposed that the United Nations Development Group for Latin America and the Caribbean extend the strategic framework by one year, until the end of 2017, to allow time for consultation with the next Government. This proposal was endorsed by the Development Group to mark the transition towards a development approach through the preparation of a United Nations Development Assistance Framework for the planning cycle starting in 2018. It is anticipated that the development of the new framework will begin in 2016.

17. MINUSTAH, with the support of the United Nations country team, will continue to support the implementation of the coordination framework for external development aid, led by the United Nations. The Group of 12 plus, a group of 16 technical and financial partners of the Haitian Government, has started an exercise of identification and joint diagnosis of key challenges in various sectors. The results of this work will form the basis for the discussion on the development agenda.

E. Results-based-budgeting frameworks

18. In order to facilitate the presentation of proposed changes in human resources, six categories for possible action with respect to staffing have been identified. A definition of the terminology with respect to the six categories is contained in annex I.A to the present report.

Executive direction and management

19. Overall mission direction and management are to be provided by the immediate Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

Table 1
Human resources: executive direction and management

	International staff								
	USG-ASG	*D-2-D-1*	*P-5-P-4*	*P-3-P-2*	*Field Service*	***Subtotal***	*National staff*[a]	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Total***
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General									
Approved posts 2015/16	1	1	3	2	2	9	8	–	17
Proposed posts 2016/17	1	1	3	2	2	9	8	–	17
Net change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Political and Rule of Law)									
Approved posts 2015/16	1	1	2	2	1	7	4	1	12
Proposed posts 2016/17	1	1	3	3	1	9	4	1	14
Net change (see table 2)	–	–	1	1	–	2	–	–	2
Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator)									
Approved posts 2015/16	1	1	2	–	1	5	6	–	11
Proposed posts 2016/17	1	–	2	–	1	4	6	–	10
Net change (see table 3)	–	(1)	–	–	–	(1)	–	–	(1)
Conduct and Discipline Team									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	2	1	–	3	3	1	7
Net change (see table 4)	–	–	2	1	–	3	3	1	7
Total									
Approved 2015/16	3	3	7	4	4	21	18	1	40
Proposed 2016/17	3	2	10	6	4	25	21	2	48
Net change	–	(1)	3	2	–	4	3	1	8

[a] Includes National Professional Officers and national General Service staff.

International staff: *Increase of 4 posts*

National staff: *Increase of 3 posts*

United Nations Volunteers: *Increase of 1 position*

Table 2

Human resources: Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Political and Rule of Law)

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	+1	P-5	Deputy Rule of Law Coordinator	Reassignment	From Independence and Accountability Section
	+1	P-3	Special Assistant	Reassignment	From Electoral Assistance Section
Net change	**+2**		**(see table 1)**		

20. Taking advantage of the efficiencies achieved by merging the Institutional Support and Law Reform Section with the Independence and Accountability Section, as described in paragraph 11 above, it is proposed that one post (P-5) presented in table 2 be reassigned to reinforce the capacity of the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Political and Rule of Law) to ensure an integrated approach for project planning, delivery, monitoring, reporting and evaluation between MINUSTAH and the United Nations country team.

21. To fill the gap that will result from the downsizing of the sections that support the rule of law pillar, the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Political and Rule of Law) will need to be reinforced to handle substantive issues in a timely manner during this critical transition period. Taking advantage of the expertise that will be made available by the abolishment of the Electoral Assistance Section, as explained in paragraph 33 below, it is proposed that one post (P-3) presented in table 2 be reassigned.

Table 3

Human resources: Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator)

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	D-1	Chief Integrated Office	Abolishment	
	-1	P-4	Special Assistant		
Subtotal	**-2**				
	+1	P-5	Electoral Adviser	Reassignment	From Electoral Assistance Section
Subtotal	**+1**				
Net change	**-1**		**(see table 1)**		

22. In the context of the continued downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, certain coordination and integration functions that are currently performed by the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator) will be outsourced to a third party paid for by the Development Operations Coordination Office at Headquarters. As a result, it is proposed that two posts presented in table 3 be abolished.

23. To maintain the capacity to deliver strategic and technical electoral advice to the national authorities, and to facilitate coordination with the United Nations country team, after the abolishment of the Electoral Assistance Section, an Electoral Adviser will be retained as part of the executive direction and management. As a result, it is proposed that one post presented in table 3 be reassigned.

Table 4
Human resources: Conduct and Discipline Team

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts/positions					
	+1	P-5	Senior Coordination Officer	Redeployment	From support component
	+1	P-4	Conduct and Discipline Officer	Redeployment	
	+1	P-2	Associate Reports Officer	Redeployment	
	+2	NPO	Conduct and Discipline Officer	Redeployment	
	+1	NGS	Team Assistant	Redeployment	
	+1	UNV	Administrative Assistant	Redeployment	
Net change	+7		**(see table 1)**		

24. The responsibility of preventing and reporting incidents of sexual exploitation, abuse and other forms of misconduct falls on all Mission personnel across all components. In that context, conduct and discipline is considered to be an integral part of the executive direction and management of the Mission. In that regard, it is proposed that the Conduct and Discipline Team, the composition of which is presented in table 4, be transferred to executive direction and management. The transfer will better reflect the nature of the work and the reporting lines, and it will align the staffing structure of MINUSTAH with other peacekeeping missions.

Component 1: security and stability

25. Component 1, which covers the activities of the Mission to assist the Government in maintaining a secure and stable environment in Haiti and to support the development of the Haitian National Police, includes: the Office of the Force Commander; the Office of the Police Commissioner, which includes the Border Management Unit; the Joint Operations Centre; the Community Violence Reduction Section; and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre.

26. The component will continue to focus on two major objectives: (a) assistance to the Government in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to institutional reform, socioeconomic development and the protection of human rights by improving the security environment throughout Haiti; and (b) development of the Haitian National Police into a professional, modern, efficient, independent and

accountable force with coverage throughout the territory, ensuring security and stability through a quick-response capability as well as adequate management of the prison administration.

27. In order to support these objectives, the priorities for the 2016/17 period will be to: (a) build and support the capacity of the Haitian National Police to maintain law and order, reinforce security in areas prone to violence and patrol the country's land and maritime borders; (b) complete the implementation of the Haitian National Police development plan for the 2012-2016 period and to initiate the implementation of the strategic plan of the Haitian National Police for the 2017-2021 period, including further development of the corrections sector, particularly the implementation of the strategic development plan of the Haitian Directorate of Prison Administration; (c) improve gender balance among Haitian police personnel and address the concerns of women in policy decisions regarding security and the rule of law; (d) strengthen the capacity of specialized police units, including administrative and logistics functions; (e) implement crime prevention strategies for at-risk urban communities historically prone to violence through a community violence reduction approach; and (f) have the military component continue to maintain a quick-reaction military capability in order to assist the Haitian National Police and the United Nations police in maintaining a secure and stable environment in Haiti.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
1.1 Improved security environment throughout Haiti	1.1.1 Maintain the annual ratio of homicides reported under 10 per 100,000 habitants (2014/15: 9.7; 2015/16: 9.6; 2016/17: 9.5)
	1.1.2 Maintain the number of reported kidnappings at the national level under 75 per year (2014/15: 49; 2015/16: 74; 2016/17: 60)
	1.1.3 Implementation of a nationwide crime prevention strategy by the Haitian Police

Outputs

- Daily patrols and planned joint operations, sweeps and operational readiness of a quick-reaction capacity led by the Haitian National Police, accompanied by the United Nations police, formed police units and troops, to reinforce security in crime-prone areas as well as along the maritime and air borders
- Provision of operational support for the Haitian National Police, upon request, in securing nationwide key sites and installations, mainly by means of fixed and mobile checkpoints by United Nations police, formed police units and troops, with major focus in Port-au-Prince
- Daily mentoring of the Haitian National Police by individual police officers co-located with the Haitian National Police in order to strengthen operational capacity at all levels

- Implementation of 26 community violence reduction projects in collaboration with ministries, local authorities, community groups and leaders and the United Nations country team in order to strengthen cohesiveness among communities; generate short-term employment and socioeconomic opportunities as an alternative to violence; provide psychosocial assistance for beneficiaries, including male and female youth at risk or linked to armed groups and children and women affected by violence in crime-prone and vulnerable areas of the North and West Departments; facilitate vulnerable group access to legal aid and contribute to reducing crime and violence through the implementation of activities linked to rapprochement between the Haitian National Police and local populations, in line with their national community policing doctrine and crime prevention strategy
- Implementation of one public outreach and community mediation project in support of community engagement, mobilization and participation to create an enabling environment for the reduction of conflict and insecurity; and fostering coordination between local authorities, communities, other national and international actors and the community violence reduction programme in order to determine needs, plan interventions and assess project impact
- Implementation of two sensitization and social mobilization activities for vulnerable groups in crime-prone areas to promote a culture of peace and raise awareness with regard to sexual and gender-based violence, including through the use of print and broadcast media outlets
- Daily technical assistance to the Haitian National Police to continue the implementation of the national crime prevention strategy and the implementation of community policing activities, including support for sensitization campaigns on the nationwide crime prevention strategy through partnerships with community police
- Provide strategic direction to the Haitian National Police in its fight against organized crime through the use of sound intelligence gathering and analytical tools, thus enabling the Haitian National Police to prioritize criminal investigations and focus crime prevention initiatives on the most vulnerable areas of the community
- Provide technical advice to the Haitian National Police through weekly meetings to ensure coordination between elements of the judicial and the administrative police in their fight against organized crime through improved information sharing and monitoring and the containment of illegal activities
- Provide daily technical assistance to the Haitian National Police forensic service to strengthen the role of the criminal investigators of the judicial police in crime scene management, and educate and promote forensic services within the various Haitian National Police at the Central Directorate as well as in the Departments, thus improving the rate at which serious crimes are resolved

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
1.2 Improved operational and institutional capacities of the Haitian National Police, with specialized units in place	1.2.1 Increase in the number of national police officers per 10,000 citizens (2014/15: 13.7; 2015/16: 14.0; 2016/17: 15.0)
	1.2.2 Increase in the percentage of female Haitian National Police officers sworn in (2014/15: 8.3; 2015/16: 11.0; 2016/17: 11.4)
	1.2.3 Increase in the number of customs surveillance officers working at each port of entry to regulate the passage of cargo and passengers (2014/15: 25; 2015/16: 125; 2016/17: 140)
	1.2.4 Drafting of a strategic plan for the Directorate of Judicial Police of the Haitian National Police for the period 2017-2021

Outputs

- Provision of daily operational advice and support to the Haitian National Police recruitment service to ensure that 27th and 28th basic entry-level promotions comply with the expected number of cadets per promotion
- Provision of weekly technical support to the Haitian National Police to improve the recruitment process with a view to implementing the strategy for promoting women's recruitment (15 per cent female cadets), retention and career development at all police levels
- Provision of daily operational advice and support to the Haitian National Police through collocation activities to complete background checks for 1,500 cadets composing the 27th and 28th promotions before completion of basic training courses
- Provision of weekly technical support to the National Police Academy on the conduct of the management support programme aimed at providing field training for 72 inspectors and 45 commissioners, with the promotion of gender balance at senior levels, including senior and middle-upper managers of the Directorate of Prison Administration
- Provision of technical assistance, on a daily basis, to increase the logistical capacity of the police school and the police academy
- Provision of technical advice to the Haitian General Customs Administration and the Ministry of Economy and Finance through weekly meetings on the drafting of guidelines on the improvement of security procedures at border crossing points, maritime ports and airports and on increasing the number of surveillance officers
- Provision of daily technical assistance to the Haitian National Police on the development of the departmental sections of the judicial police, with specific focus on Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes, in close coordination with the Model Jurisdictions Section
- Provision of daily advice to the Directorate of Judicial Police of the Haitian National Police in the drafting and implementation of a strategic plan for the Directorate for the period 2017-2021

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
1.3 Improved administrative and management capacities of the Haitian National Police, with relevant specialized units in place	1.3.1 Drafting, adoption and implementation of the Haitian National Police strategic plan for the period 2017-2021
	1.3.2 Increase in the number of trained and fully equipped officers in specialized units and prison security (2014/15: 1,111; 2015/16: 1,254; 2016/17: 1,525)
	1.3.3 Increase in the number of trained officers in sexual gender-based violence cell of the Directorate of Judicial Police to investigate related incidents (2015/16: 21; 2016/17: 45)
	1.3.4 The Directorate of budget and finance of the Haitian National Police assumes full responsibility for planning, drafting and executing the fiscal year budget, notably through the administration of the budget and procurement processes and the allocation of resources to police units

Outputs

- Provision of daily advice and support to the Haitian National Police Strategic Planning Unit in the development, consultation, adoption and implementation of the Haitian National Police strategic plan for the period 2017-2021
- Provision of weekly technical assistance to the Haitian National Police on the continued enhancement of its budget and finance system, including adequate and specific allocation of resources to specialized police units and to the Directorate of Prison Administration, and on the continued growth of the capacity of its procurement management system
- Provision of weekly technical advice to the Haitian National Police in specialized areas, particularly in judicial police, criminal intelligence, forensics, crowd control, community policing, rapid intervention, prison security and incident management, border security and border management and the coast guard service
- Provision of daily technical assistance to the Haitian National Police forensic service, and to the crime scene investigation teams with the aim of increasing their capacity to respond to a crime scene
- Provide training to 150-200 specialized Haitian National Police investigators as well as to investigating judges
- Provision of weekly technical assistance to the Haitian National Police to strengthen the sexual and gender-based violence cell within the Directorate of Judicial Police, including the organization of one workshop on sexual and gender-based violence, with the participation of the Haitian National Police, prosecutors and magistrates
- Provide daily technical assistance to the Haitian National Police sexual and gender-based violence cell with regard to human resources, strategic planning and international exposure

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
1.4 Enhanced ability of the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police to provide oversight to the entire police institution	1.4.1 Development, consultation and approval of a strategic development plan for the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police for the period 2017-2021
	1.4.2 Increase in the number of staff of the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police equitably deployed throughout the entire country, with consideration of gender balance and administrative capacity to function in accordance with international norms (2014/15: 227; 2015/16: 300; 2016/17: 325)
	1.4.3 Increase in the number of monthly departmental audits/inspections conducted by the General Inspectorate nationwide (2015/16: 1; 2016/17: 2)
	1.4.4 Increase in the number of cases of alleged human rights violations, the illegal use of lethal force and other alleged cases of misconduct, including sexual exploitation, investigated by the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police that resulted in a recommendation of sanctions (2014/15: 196; 2015/16: 150; 2016/17: 200)

Outputs

- Provision of technical assistance to and consultation with the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police on the drafting and implementation of the strategic plan for the General Inspectorate for the 2017-2019 period, taking the gender perspective into consideration, including the priorities determined in the strategic plan for the Haitian National Police for the period 2017-2021. Assistance will be provided through weekly meetings, monthly press conferences, biannual monitoring of the progress on the activities of the development plan for the period 2012-2016 and through the annual report of the General Inspectorate
- Provision of daily technical assistance to the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police through the sharing of investigative reports on alleged human rights violations and daily meetings with the Chief Inspector General to follow up on cases of alleged human rights violations, including the illegal use of lethal force and other alleged cases of misconduct and, when relevant, on sanctions by the Inspectorate General of the Haitian National Police
- Provision of daily assistance to the Haitian National Police, in conjunction with the Office of the Chief Inspector General, on the vetting of the integrity of new cadets joining the Haitian National Police
- Provision of technical support and advice, through bimonthly meetings, to the General Inspectorate, to review and/or develop regulations related to the implementation of police services inspection and annual audits

External factors

The transition to a new Government of Haiti may slowdown the implementation of the development plan (2012-2016) for the Haitian National Police and the drafting and adoption of the strategic plan (2017-2021) for the Haitian National Police

Table 5
Human resources: component 1, security and stability

Category	*Total*
I. Military contingents	
Approved 2015/16	2 370
Proposed 2016/17	2 370
Net change	–
II. United Nations police	
Approved 2015/16	951
Proposed 2016/17	951
Net change	–
III. Formed police units	
Approved 2015/16	1 600
Proposed 2016/17	1 600
Net change	–
IV. Government-provided personnel	
Approved 2015/16	50
Proposed 2016/17	50
Net change	–

V. Civilian staff	International staff								
	USG-ASG	D-2-D-1	P-5-P-4	P-3-P-2	Field Service	Subtotal	National staff[a]	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Office of the Force Commander									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	1	–	–	1	2	3	–	5
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	4
Net change (see table 6)	–	–	–	–	–	–	(1)	–	(1)
Office of the Police Commissioner									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	2	5	–	1	8	16	8	32
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	2	5	–	1	8	16	8	32
Net change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Joint Mission Analysis Centre									
Approved 2015/16	–	–	1	2	1	4	–	2	6
Proposed 2016/17	–	–	1	2	1	4	–	2	6
Net change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Joint Operations Centre									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	2	3	–	5	1	1	7
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	2	3	–	5	1	1	7
Net change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Community Violence Reduction Section									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	2	2	1	5	20	5	30
Net change (see table 7)	–	–	2	2	1	5	20	5	30
Subtotal, civilian staff									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	3	8	5	3	19	20	11	50
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	3	10	7	4	24	39	16	79
Net change	–	–	2	2	1	5	19	5	29
Total (I-V)									
Approved 2015/16	–	3	8	5	3	19	20	11	5 021
Proposed 2016/17	–	3	10	7	4	24	39	16	5 050
Net change	–	–	2	2	1	5	19	5	29

[a] Includes National Professional Officers and national General Service staff.

International staff: Increase of 5 international posts

National staff: Increase of 19 national posts

United Nations Volunteers: Increase of 5 positions

Table 6
Human resources: Office of the Force Commander

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	NGS	Driver	Abolishment	
Net change	**-1**		**(see table 5)**		

28. In the context of the continued downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, it is proposed that one post presented in table 6 be abolished.

Table 7
Human resources: Community Violence Reduction Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts/positions					
	-1	P-2	Associate Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer	Abolishment	
	-1	NGS	Admin Assistant		
Subtotal	**-2**				
	+1	P-5	Chief Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer	Redeployment	
	+1	P-4	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer	Redeployment	
	+2	P-3	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer	Redeployment	
	+1	P-2	Associate Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer	Redeployment	From democratic governance and State legitimacy component
	+1	FS	Administrative Officer	Redeployment	
	+11	NPO	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer	Redeployment	
	+7	NGS	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Assistant	Redeployment	
	+1	NGS	Admin Assistant	Redeployment	
	+2	NGS	Driver	Redeployment	From democratic governance and State legitimacy component
	+5	UNV	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer	Redeployment	
Subtotal	**+32**				
Net change	**+30**		**(see table 5)**		

29. To align the section delivering the outputs on community violence under this framework with the appropriate component, it is proposed to transfer the Community Violence Reduction Section from the democratic governance and State legitimacy component to the security and stability component. The posts to be transferred are presented in table 7. In addition, and in the context of the continued downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, it is also proposed that two posts presented in table 7 be abolished.

Component 2: democratic governance and State legitimacy

30. Component 2 reflects the assistance provided by MINUSTAH to the Government in strengthening democratic governance, consolidating the authority of the State and developing its institutions. The component incorporates the activities of the Political Affairs Section, the Civil Affairs Section, the Communications and Public Information Section and the Regional Coordination Unit.

31. MINUSTAH will continue to undertake its good offices initiatives and to facilitate conflict mediation processes and early warning assessments on threats to stability. The Mission will also continue to play a role in civil society empowerment and support State and local institutions jointly with other partners, including the United Nations country team. While MINUSTAH will continue to provide advice and technical assistance to political, legislative and governance processes, particular attention will be focused on monitoring political and security developments and engaging in conflict resolution and mediation. In strengthening the capacity of State institutions, focus will be directed towards adoption of new or revised key legislation and the coordination of the activities of non-governmental organizations. The Mission will continue the work on promoting political stability and the consolidation of democracy in Haiti, including the building of consensus between the legislative and executive branches of the Government and the adoption and promulgation of key legislation.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
2.1 All-inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation	2.1.1 Adoption of a legislative agenda mutually agreed upon by the executive branch and Parliament
	2.1.2 Maintain the number of local authorities and civil society organizations, including women's groups, that are engaged in political dialogue, conflict resolution and management at the local level (2014/15: 34; 2015/16: 50; 2016/17: 50)

Outputs

- Conduct of bimonthly meetings with the President's main advisers to provide advice on an all-inclusive political process
- Conduct four workshops with women's organizations and the Ministry of Women's Affairs in each of the regional offices to identify key priority issues and laws

- Undertake a review of gender discriminatory laws and conduct of one national advocacy workshop with the Ministry of Women's Affairs, representatives of women's organizations and Parliament on a gender sensitive legislative agenda
- Conduct of three technical support meetings with parliamentary commissions and/or the Gender Equity Office on key priority laws and to advocate for gender-sensitive laws, in partnership with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women)
- Organization of one national civil society symposium with at least 50 civil society organizations participating in strengthening State-society linkages and helping improve governance
- Provision of technical support in two departments on at least a quarterly basis to departmental multisectoral technical tables and/or civil society consultations/meetings
- Conduct of a nationwide multimedia public information campaign in support of political dialogue, national reconciliation, peace and the promotion of stable national institutions, through public advocacy and civic education using various communications tools, including partnerships with national media

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
2.2 Strengthened capacity of State institutions to provide services at the central and local levels	2.2.1 Adoption of new or revised laws on civil service, protection of whistle-blowers and coordination of non-governmental organizations
	2.2.2 Formulation, with the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities, of a gender-sensitive action plan to support the central coordination of delegations

Outputs

- Provision of at least eight technical assistance meetings to the directorate of local government at the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities to advocate for key legal provisions and follow up on key priorities with respect to governance issues
- Organization and conduct of two workshops with the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities to develop an action plan on departmental administration and the coordination of departmental delegations
- Implementation of 60 quick-impact projects to strengthen State capacities to provide basic public services to the population, reinforce rule of law structures, support civil society engagement in good governance and provide opportunities to foster democracy in all 10 departments, with a higher concentration around the two regional offices
- Conduct of one nationwide multimedia public information campaign in support of political dialogue, national reconciliation, peace and the promotion of stable national institutions through public advocacy and civil education using various communication tools, including partnerships on joint projects with national entities and national media

External factors

Political parties, both in the Government and in the opposition, will be committed to advancing the legislative agenda and achieving critical national priorities. The Electoral Council will be able to organize elections without support from external actors progressively less support from external partners

Table 8
Human resources: component 2, democratic governance and State legitimacy

Civilian staff	International staff								
	USG-ASG	D-2-D-1	P-5-P-4	P-3-P-2	Field Service	Subtotal	National staff[a]	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Political Affairs Section									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	1	5	2	1	9	6	–	15
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	1	5	2	1	9	6	–	15
Net change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Communications and Public Information Section									
Approved 2015/16	–	1	2	2	5	10	52	1	63
Proposed 2016/17	–	1	2	2	5	10	39	1	50
Net change (see table 9)	–	–	–	–	–	–	(13)	–	(13)
Electoral Assistance Section									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	3	1	–	4	12	9	25
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Net change (see table 10)	–	–	(3)	(1)	–	(4)	(12)	(9)	(25)
Community Violence Reduction Section									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	2	3	1	6	21	5	32
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Net change (see table 7)	–	–	(2)	(3)	(1)	(6)	(21)	(5)	(32)
Regional Coordination Unit									
Approved 2015/16	–	–	4	–	–	4	–	–	4
Proposed 2016/17	–	–	2	–	–	2	–	–	2
Net change (see table 11)	–	–	(2)	–	–	(2)	–	–	(2)
Civil Affairs Section									
Approved 2015/16	–	1	5	8	2	16	34	6	56
Proposed 2016/17	–	–	3	7	1	11	20	4	35
Net change (see table 12)	–	(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(5)	(14)	(2)	(21)
Legal Affairs Section									
Approved 2015/16	–	–	3	1	1	5	2	–	7
Proposed 2016/17	–	–	3	1	1	5	2	–	7
Net change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total									
Approved 2015/16	–	3	24	17	10	54	127	21	202
Proposed 2016/17	–	2	15	12	8	37	67	5	109
Net change	–	(1)	(9)	(5)	(2)	(17)	(60)	(16)	(93)

[a] Includes National Professional Officers and national General Service staff.

International staff: *Decrease of 17 posts*

National staff: *Decrease of 60 posts*

United Nations Volunteers: *Decrease of 16 positions*

Table 9
Human resources: Communications and Public Information Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Post					
	-7	NGS	Radio Production Assistant	Abolishment	
	-3	NGS	Public Information Assistant		
	-1	NGS	Radio studio technician		
	-1	NGS	TV/Video Production Assistant		
	-1	NGS	Light vehicle driver		
Net change	**-13**		**(see table 8)**		

32. In the context of the continued downsizing of the Mission as described in paragraph 10 above, the Communications and Public Information Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that 13 posts presented in table 9 be abolished.

Table 10
Human resources: Electoral Assistance Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts/positions					
	-2	P-4	Electoral Officer	Abolishment	
	-11	NPO	Electoral Officer		
	-1	NGS	Administrative Assistant		
	-9	UNV	Electoral Officer		
Subtotal	**-23**				
	-1	P-3	Electoral Officer	Reassignment	To the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Political and Rule of Law) as Special Assistant
Subtotal	**-1**				
	-1	P-5	Chief Electoral Affairs Adviser	Reassignment	To the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator) as Electoral Advisor
Subtotal	**-1**				
Net change	**-25**		**(see table 8)**		

33. Following the conclusion of the 2015 electoral process, the Mission will substantially reduce its electoral assistance activities. The responsibilities for capacity-building in electoral processes will be transferred to Haitian institutions. In this context, it is proposed that the Electoral Assistance Section be dissolved and 23 posts presented in table 10 be abolished. The reassignments of the Electoral Officer and the Chief Electoral Affairs Adviser are explained in paragraphs 21 and 23 above.

34. The proposed transfer of the Community Violence Reduction Section to the security and stability component is explained in paragraph 29 above.

Table 11
Human resources: Regional Coordination Unit

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-2	P-5	Chief of Regional Office	Abolishment	
Net change	**-2**		**(see table 8)**		

35. Given the closure of two regional offices, in the context of the continued downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, it is proposed that two posts presented in table 11 be abolished.

Table 12
Human resources: Civil Affairs Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	D-1	Chief Civil Affairs Officer	Abolishment	
	-1	P-5	Senior Civil Affairs Officer		
	-1	P-4	Civil Affairs Officer		
	-1	P-3	Civil Affairs Officer		
	-1	FS	Administrative Assistant		
	-11	NPO	Civil Affairs Officer		
	-3	NGS	Administrative Assistant		
	-2	UNV	Civil Affairs Officer		
Net change	**-21**		**(see table 8)**		

36. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, MINUSTAH will continue to disengage from traditional institutional support and capacity-building activities to focus on the monitoring of and reporting on activities that can undermine stability and peacebuilding and on empowering civil society. As a result, the Civil Affairs Section will be consolidated and it is proposed that 21 posts presented in table 12 be abolished.

Component 3: Rule of law and human rights

37. Component 3 covers the activities undertaken by MINUSTAH to assist the Government in the development of legal and judicial institutions and prison services to protect and advance human rights. It consists of the Model Jurisdictions Section, the Accountability, Institutional Support and Law Reform Section, the Corrections Unit, the Human Rights Section, the Child Protection Unit and the Gender Unit.

38. The Mission will continue to focus on providing assistance to the Government in four high-impact, far-reaching areas in order to lay the foundation for the development of a culture of the rule of law and the protection of human rights by: (a) the establishment and/or strengthening of fundamental accountability mechanisms in compliance with international criminal justice and human rights norms and standards; (b) providing assistance to Government entities on the functioning of key justice institutions, such as the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the establishment of juvenile courts nationwide and a national legal aid programme; (c) increasing compliance and engagement by the Government of Haiti with United Nations human rights instruments, mechanisms and bodies through the appointment of a high-level focal point within the executive branch to coordinate action on human rights issues and activating the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights; (d) the completion, adoption and implementation of crucial law reforms; and (e) progress towards an efficient judicial system in three model jurisdictions (Cap-Haïtien), (Les Cayes) and (Port-au-Prince) in close coordination with police and corrections components of the Mission.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
3.1 Progress in the establishment and/or strengthening and functioning of key accountability mechanisms in compliance with international human rights standards	3.1.1 Superior Council of the Judiciary assumes its full role in providing oversight of the judiciary, notably by having in place an operational mechanism for the evaluation of judges, the certification process of judges and a judicial inspectorate
	3.1.2 All allegations against judges investigated by the Judicial Inspectorate of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (2014/15: 20; 2015/16: 50; 2016/17: 60)

Outputs

- Provision of technical assistance through two visits by two international experts on judicial inspections
- Drafting of a manual on the evaluation of magistrates to enhance understanding among judges of the evaluation process; adoption of the manual and its insertion in revised internal rules
- Conduct of one workshop in each appellate jurisdiction addressing the evaluation process of judges
- Conduct of bimonthly meetings, advocacy and support for the implementation of the evaluation process in five jurisdictions and specific monitoring in the three model jurisdictions (Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes)
- Conduct of bimonthly meetings, advocacy and support for a permanent joint working group between the Ministry of Justice and the Superior Judicial Council in order to delineate the separation of powers and respective competences of the judiciary and the executive power

- Provision of technical support for the continued implementation of the training module on gender and justice for the magistracy school and judicial actors
- Conduct of one advocacy workshop on gender and the administration of justice for senior judicial actors
- Provision of technical support by an expert financed by the Canadian/Quebec Governments for the design and implementation of a system for the evaluation of prosecutors

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
3.2 Progress in the functioning of key justice institutions, such as the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the prosecution services, the establishment of juvenile courts nationwide and a national legal aid programme	3.2.1 Adoption and implementation of a law of the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security 3.2.2 Identification of key institutional and operational challenges impacting the effectiveness and accountability of the prosecution services 3.2.3 Maintaining the number of first-instance juvenile courts in all appeals jurisdictions (2014/15: 0; 2015/16: 18; 2016/17: 18) and adoption and implementation of the child code 3.2.4 Implementation of a national legal aid programme for indigent individuals, including for victims of sexual and gender-based violence and women in prolonged pretrial detention

Outputs

- Conduct of bimonthly meetings with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security to support the implementation of the law of the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security
- Support for the preparation of a new strategic plan by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security
- Conduct an assessment with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Superior Council of the Judiciary to identify key institutional and operational challenges affecting the effectiveness and accountability of the prosecution services
- Conduct of bimonthly meetings with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Superior Council of the Judiciary to provide technical and logistical support for the establishment of the three remaining juvenile courts and on the drafting of internal rules for the functioning of those courts
- Provision of technical support and advice through bimonthly meetings on the development and implementation of the national programme on legal aid, including for victims of sexual and gender-based violence and women in prolonged pretrial detention, and participate and provide legal advice through monthly meetings and on the drafting of the law on legal aid
- Conduct a scoping assessment to study the feasibility of a comprehensive justice and security public expenditure review in order to identify the long-term affordability and sustainability challenges in the sector in light of the transition of the Mission

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
3.3 Increased compliance and engagement by the Government of Haiti with United Nations human rights instruments, mechanisms and bodies	3.3.1 Increase in the number of recommendations by the United Nations human rights instruments, mechanisms and bodies, including the recommendations resulting from the universal periodic review, implemented by the Government (2014/15: 20; 2015/16: 20; 2016/17: 22)
	3.3.2 The Government of Haiti accepts all requests for visits by the United Nations human rights special procedures and United Nations human rights officials (2014/15: 2; 2015/16: 2; 2016/17: 1)
	3.3.3 Maintain the number of overdue reports by the Government of Haitian to human rights instruments, mechanisms and bodies on the implementation of their obligations to a minimum (2014/15: 2; 2015/16: 1; 2016/17: 1)
	3.3.4 Increase in the number of police and judiciary proceedings concluded in relation to emblematic cases of serious violations of human rights (2014/15: 0; 2015/16: 0; 2016/17: 1)
	3.3.5 Relaunch of the process for the development and roll-out of a national action plan on human rights in consultation with government agencies, the legislative and judicial branches, the Office for the Protection of Citizens and civil society organizations
	3.3.6 Appointment of a high-level focal point within the executive branch to coordinate action on human rights issues and activate the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights

Outputs

- Conduct of at least four meetings with Government entities and other actors to ensure appropriate coordination for the relaunch of the process for the development of a national human rights action plan; and follow-up on the engagement of the Government of Haiti with regard to the implementation of recommendations resulting from the universal periodic review and the ratification of key human rights instruments and on the preparation and submission of reports to the human rights treaties bodies, namely, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
- Conduct of at least two meetings, on an ad hoc basis, with government entities for the drafting and submission of the country report for the 2016 universal periodic review
- Conduct of two meetings with civil society organizations to support the drafting of at least two alternative reports, as provided for under the procedures of the United Nations human rights treaty mechanisms and bodies, to improve the advocacy capacity of civil society

- Organization of at least two press conferences to publicize visits of the special procedures of the Human Rights Council and United Nations human rights officials and to share their findings on the human rights situation in Haiti
- Development of a plan to record past human rights violations through the organization of two meetings with national actors
- Monitoring of ongoing violations of human rights and the publication of at least one report on the subject
- Organization of awareness-raising activities in celebration of at least one international human rights day, involving youth and women's organizations, through outreach advocacy groups, radio and television programming and the distribution of promotional materials, to increase the advocacy capacity of youth and women's organizations

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
3.4 Progress towards completion, adoption and implementation of crucial law reform	3.4.1 Adoption and implementation of the criminal code and criminal procedure code, including sensitization
	3.4.2 Drafting of laws related to penal reform on the organization of the Office of the Prosecutor, legal aid and forensic institute

Outputs

- Provision of support through weekly meetings and technical advice for the drafting and implementation of the criminal code and the criminal procedure code, including sensitization
- Provision of support through bimonthly meetings with and technical advice to the reform commission for the drafting of the law on the organization of the Office of the Prosecutor and the provision of legal aid
- Provision of support through bimonthly meetings and technical advice for the creation of a committee for the implementation of the new penal code and criminal procedure code
- Provision of support through weekly meetings and technical advice for the drafting of an organic law for the national forensic institute
- Provision of technical support for identification of discriminatory laws against women and girls, in support of a national gender equality action plan

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
3.5 Progress towards an efficient judicial system in three model jurisdictions (Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes)	3.5.1 Increase in the efficiency of the judicial system in the three model jurisdictions by holding at least 300 court hearings per year on penal cases in Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes and at least 420 court hearings in Port-au-Prince, representing. at least, a 20 per cent increase (2014/15: Cap-Haïtien: 140, Les Cayes: 120, Port-au-Prince: 250; 2015/16: Cap-Haïtien: 250, Les Cayes: 250, Port-au-Prince: 350; 2016/17: Cap-Haïtien: 300, Les Cayes: 300, Port-au-Prince: 420)

3.5.2 Increase the number of cases closed by investigating judges in the three model jurisdictions in Port-au-Prince and in Les Cayes and Cap-Haïtien (2014/15: Les Cayes: 136, Port-au-Prince: 1,050, Cap-Haïtien: 175; 2015/16: Les Cayes: 162, Port-au-Prince: 1,155, Cap-Haïtien: 210; 2016/17: Port-au-Prince: 1,270, Les Cayes: 195, Cap-Haïtien: 252)

3.5.3 Decrease the percentage of prisoners held in pretrial detention in Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes and maintain at least at the same level the percentage of prisoners held in pretrial detention in Port-au-Prince (2014/15: Port-au-Prince: 87 per cent, Les Cayes: 78 per cent, Cap-Haïtien: 50 per cent; 2015/16: Port-au-Prince: 65 per cent, Les Cayes: 60 per cent, Cap-Haïtien: 40 per cent; 2016/17: Port-au-Prince: 65 per cent, Les Cayes: 55 per cent, Cap-Haïtien: 35 per cent)

3.5.4 Increase the number of cases closed by legal aid offices in Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes by 50 per cent (2014/2015: Cap Haïtien: 67, Les Cayes: 49; 2015/16: Cap-Haïtien: 91, Les Cayes: 67; 2016/17: Cap-Haïtien: 135, Les Cayes: 100)

3.5.5 Increase the number of female and male detainees having access to legal aid in Cap Haïtien and Les Cayes by 50 per cent (2014/15: Cap-Haïtien: 160, Les Cayes: 200; 2015/16: Cap Haïtien: 192, Les Cayes: 240, 2016/17: Cap-Haïtien: 288, Les Cayes: 360)

3.5.6 Increase in the number of victims of sexual and gender-based violence who receive assistance from the legal aid offices in Les Cayes and Cap-Haïtien (2015/16: Cap Haïtien: 25, Les Cayes: 0, 2016/17: Cap-Haïtien: 100, Les Cayes: 100)

Outputs

- Provision of technical support through daily advocacy to the actors of the courts in the three model jurisdictions and monitoring of court hearings
- Provision of technical support to the legal aid offices in Les Cayes and Cap-Haïtien, through the identification of detainees in pretrial detention, the distribution of the files to the legal aid offices, and the monitoring of the legal aid offices activities
- Provision of technical support for the three pilot projects of first instance courts to reinforce the functioning of registry, Prosecutor's Office, investigative judges' cabinets and Office of the Dean of the Court in the model jurisdiction
- Provision of legal aid through the legal aid offices to indigent individuals who have been detained awaiting trials and to women and children in the model jurisdiction in the North and South departments

- Provision of technical support to court actors through daily advocacy for the effective implementation of immediate trial procedure
- Provision of technical support through weekly monitoring of new incarcerations for quick treatment of cases
- Organization of three training workshops on gender and sexual and gender-based violence for judicial actors in the three model jurisdictions
- Provision of legal aid through the legal aid offices to victims of sexual and gender-based violence in the model jurisdiction in the North and South departments

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
3.6 Improvements in infrastructure, health and sanitation in the Haitian corrections system, especially in the three model jurisdictions	3.6.1 Implementation of the strategic plan of the Directorate of Prison Administration to increase its efficiency and autonomy (2014/15: 0; 2015/16: 10 per cent; 2016/17: 100 per cent)
	3.6.2 Commencement of the drafting of the strategic plan of the Directorate of Prison Administration for the period 2017-2021
	3.6.3 Maintain the number of standard operating procedures being implemented in all prisons and compliance with international human rights standards and norms on the treatment of prisoners (2014/15: 14; 2015/16: 14; 2016/17: 14)
	3.6.4 Electronic data management system (Automated Fingerprints Integrated System) is implemented in three prisons (Port au Prince, Les Cayes and Cap-Haïtien) (2015/16: 1; 2016/17:3)
	3.6.5 Penitentiary training curriculum is developed and implemented

Outputs

- Provision of technical support and advice to the Directorate General and the Central Division of Administration of the Haitian National Police for the implementation of the strategic development plan of the Directorate of Prison Administration
- Provision of technical support and advice to initiate the drafting of the strategic development plan of for the period 2017-2021 for the Directorate of Prison Administration through weekly meetings
- Co-location of up to 18 MINUSTAH corrections officers within prisons in the three model jurisdiction locations to provide advisory and technical support to national authorities on effective prison management at six prison facilities
- Daily mentoring and technical support on security plan implemented in 10 prison facilities

- Coordination of four advocacy meetings with national authorities from the Directorate of Prison Administration and the Haitian National Police on prison and corrections policy, programming and services in order to increase their commitment, ownership and accountability
- Provision of support in the organization of two conferences for all regional directors and all heads of prisons of the Directorate of Prison Administration
- Support the Directorate of Prison Administration with both financial and technical support to roll out the Automated Fingerprints Integrated System in prisons in Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes
- Provision of technical and logistic support to the Directorate of Prison Administration through weekly meetings to develop a formal penitentiary training curriculum

External factors

National human rights and rule of law institutions will continue to commit to the investigation of human rights violations and will continue to cooperate in taking actions against police and public officials suspected of such violations

Table 13
Human resources: component 3, rule of law and human rights

	International staff								
Civilian staff	*USG-ASG*	*D-2-D-1*	*P-5-P-4*	*P-3-P-2*	*Field Service*	***Subtotal***	*National staff[a]*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Total***
Institutional Support and Law Reform Section									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	2	–	–	2	4	–	6
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Net change (see table 14)	–	–	(2)	–	–	(2)	(4)	–	(6)
Independence and Accountability Section									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	2	–	–	2	3	–	5
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Net change (see table 15)	–	–	(2)	–	–	(2)	(3)	–	(5)
Accountability, Institutional Support and Law Reform Section									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	3	–	–	3	7	–	10
Net change	–	–	3	–	–	3	7	–	10
Model Jurisdictions Section									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	2	2	–	4	13	2	19
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	2	2	–	4	13	2	19
Net change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Civilian staff	International staff						National staff[a]	United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG-ASG	D-2-D-1	P-3-P-4	P-3-P-2	Field Service	Subtotal			
Human Rights Section									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	1	4	8	–	13	19	3	35
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	1	4	7	–	12	17	3	32
Net change (see table 16)	–	–	–	(1)	–	(1)	(2)	–	(3)
Child Protection Unit									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	1	–	–	1	3	–	4
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	1
Net change (see table 17)	–	–	–	–	–	–	(3)	–	(3)
Gender Unit									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	1	–	–	1	4	1	6
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	1	–	–	1	4	1	6
Net change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Corrections Unit									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	1	2	–	3	6	1	10
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	1	2	–	3	6	1	10
Net change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Border Management Unit									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	3	–	–	3	2	–	5
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	3	–	–	3	2	–	5
Net change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total									
Approved 2015/16	–	1	16	12	–	29	54	7	90
Proposed 2016/17	–	1	15	11	–	27	49	7	83
Net change	–	–	(1)	(1)	–	(2)	(5)	–	(7)

[a] Includes National Professional Officers and national General Service staff.

International staff: *Decrease of 2 posts*

National staff: *Decrease of 5 posts*

Table 14
Human resources: Institutional Support and Law Reform Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	P-5	Senior Judicial Affairs Officer	Redeployment	To Accountability, Institutional Support and Law Reform Section
	-1	P-4	Judicial Affairs Officer	Redeployment	
	-3	NPO	Judicial Affairs Officer	Redeployment	
	-1	NGS	Administrative Assistant	Redeployment	
Net change	-6		**(see table 13)**		

39. As a result of the merger of the Institutional Support and Law Reform Section with the Independence and Accountability Section, as explained in paragraph 11 above, it is proposed that six posts presented in table 14 be redeployed.

Table 15
Human resources: Independence and Accountability Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	P-5	Senior Judicial Affairs Officer	Reassignment	To the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Political and Rule of Law) as Deputy Rule of Law Coordinator
Subtotal	-1				
	-1	P-4	Judicial Affairs Officer	Redeployment	To Accountability, Institutional Support and Law Reform Section
	-2	NPO	Judicial Affairs Officer	Redeployment	
	-1	NGS	Administrative Assistant	Redeployment	
Subtotal	-4				
Net change	-5		**(see table 13)**		

40. The reassignment of the Senior Judicial Affairs Officer is explained in paragraph 20 above. As a result of the merger of the Institutional Support and Law Reform Section with the Independence and Accountability Section, as explained in paragraph 11 above, it is proposed that four posts presented in table 15 be redeployed.

41. The proposal to establish an Accountability, Institutional Support and Law Reform Section, by merging two sections, is explained in paragraph 11 above. The proposed staffing establishment of the new section will comprise 10 posts (1 P-5, 2 P-4, 5 National Professional Officer, 2 national General Service) redeployed from

the Institutional Support and Law Reform Section and the Independence and Accountability Section as presented in tables 14 and 15.

Table 16
Human resources: Human Rights Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	P-3	Human Rights Officer	Abolishment	
	-2	NPO	Human Rights Officer		
Net change	**-3**		**(see table 13)**		

42. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission as described in paragraph 10 above, the Human Rights Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that three posts presented in table 16 be abolished.

Table 17
Human resources: Child Protection

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts	-2	NPO	Child Protection Officer	Abolishment	
	-1	NGS	Administrative Assistant		
Net change	**-3**		**(see table 13)**		

43. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission as described in paragraph 10 above, it is proposed to retain only one Child Protection Officer, who will provide the relevant internal training courses and ensure that the issues of child protection are reflected in the work performed by the Mission as a whole. As a result, it is proposed that three posts presented in table 17 be abolished.

Component 4: support

44. The support component will continue to provide effective and efficient logistical, administrative and security services in support of the implementation of the mandate of the Mission through the delivery of related outputs and the introduction of service improvements and the realization of efficiency gains. Support will be provided to the authorized strength of 2,370 military contingent personnel, 1,600 formed police personnel, 951 United Nations police and 50 corrections officers, as well as to 319 international staff, 932 national staff and 94 United Nations Volunteers. The range of support will comprise all support services, including personnel, administration, contract management, finance, procurement, the maintenance and construction of office and accommodation facilities, air and surface transport, information and communications technology and health care, as well as the provision of security services mission-wide. In addition, the Mission will continue its efforts to secure and improve the use and functions of Umoja as well as to provide aviation services that are safe, reliable, effective and cost-efficient through the improved integration of military aviation assets into the regular flight schedule.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
4.1 Effective and efficient administrative, logistical and support to the Mission	4.1.1 Uninterrupted medical services for all Mission personnel in all locations through routine access and after-hours urgent care
	4.1.2 Mission-wide aviation resources are available and accessible by Mission personnel for the implementation of the mandate
	4.1.3 The terms of the memorandum of understanding with the police-contributing countries and troop-contributing countries are met, and the verification process is fully implemented
	4.1.4 The inventory holdings of the Mission are reviewed, in keeping with the established key performance indicators and ratios, and appropriate action is taken to addresses surplus and obsolescence
	4.1.5 The recommendations of the civilian staffing review are implemented and staffing resources are realigned accordingly

Outputs

Military, police and civilian personnel

- Emplacement, rotation and repatriation of an average strength of 2,370 military contingent personnel, 951 United Nations police offices, 50 corrections officers and 1,600 formed police personnel
- Verification, monitoring and inspection of contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment for the military and police personnel
- Storage and supply of 705,250 individual meals (1,626 tons of rations), 36,270 combat rations and 163,215 litres of water for 2,370 military contingent and 1,600 formed police personnel in 17 locations
- Administration of an average of 1,346 civilian staff, comprising 320 international staff, 932 national staff and 94 United Nations Volunteers
- Continue the implementation of a conduct and discipline programme for all military, police and civilian personnel, including training, prevention, monitoring and disciplinary action

Facilities and infrastructure

- Maintenance and repair of 62 compounds, including15 military camps, 11 formed police unit sites, 2 United Nations police premises, 19 United Nations police sites co-located with Haitian National Police, 12 civilian staff premises and 3 information and communications technology services radio repeater sites
- Sanitation services for all premises, including sewage and garbage collection and disposal in all locations
- Operation and maintenance of 7 United Nations-owned water purification plants in 6 locations
- Operation and maintenance of 31 United Nations-owned wastewater treatment plants in 17 locations

- Operation and maintenance of 197 United Nations owned generators, 68 light towers and 17 welding generators
- Maintenance and renovation of 10 km of gravel roads
- Maintenance of 1 airfield facility and 9 main helicopter landing sites in 7 locations
- Storage, supply and account for of 16.527 million litres of petrol, oil and lubricants for generators

Ground transportation

- Supply and account for of 2.975 million litres of petrol, oil and lubricants for ground transportation
- Operation and maintenance of 756 United Nations owned vehicles, including 18 armoured vehicles, at 3 workshops in 3 locations
- Operation of weekday shuttle bus services for 13 scheduled local routes twice daily for civilian staff; taxi service for all MINUSTAH personnel during the workday on 13 local routes to support operations during working hours; and unscheduled transport for personnel upon request
- Conduct of 800 driving tests and issuance of United Nations driving permits for all newly-arrived personnel
- Conduct/implement the road safety programmes of the Mission

Air transportation

- Provision of air transportation services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, including unscheduled flights upon request, medical evacuation and casualty evacuations that are safe, effective and reliable in support of the mandate of the Mission
- Operation and maintenance of 5 rotary-wing military aircraft and 1 fixed-wing civilian aircraft
- Administration of a total of 2,100 flight hours (1,500 flying hours of helicopters and 600 flight hours of fixed-wing aircraft to cover all the services required by the Mission mandated tasks; including search and rescue, casualty and medical evacuations, night flight operations and military reconnaissance flights)
- Supply and account for of 1.071 million litres of aviation fuel for air transportation

Communications

- Support and maintenance of a satellite network consisting of two earth station hubs to provide voice, fax, video and data communications
- Support and maintenance of 13 very small aperture terminal (VSAT) systems, 23 telephone exchanges and 98 microwave links
- Support and maintenance of 77 ultra-high frequency (UHF) repeaters
- Support and maintenance of FM radio broadcast stations in radio production facilities

Information technology

- Support and maintenance of 1,171 desktop computers, 1,129 laptop computers and 320 printers in various locations
- Support and maintenance of 19 local area networks (LAN) and 18 wide area networks (WAN) for 3,100 users (accounts) in various locations

Medical

- Provision of ambulance service 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with a medical team composed of a paramedic/nurse and a driver for MINUSTAH personnel in Port-au-Prince
- Maintenance of a United Nations dispensary at the logistics base during working hours and on call for emergencies after working hours
- Maintain active surveillance on the flu pandemic, Ebola virus disease and other health threats by monitoring the epidemiological changes in Haiti

Security

- Provision of security services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, throughout the Mission area
- 24-hour close protection for senior Mission staff and visiting high-level officials
- Mission-wide site security assessment, including residential surveys for 150 residences
- Conduct of a total of 18 information sessions on security awareness and contingency plans for all mission staff
- Induction security training and primary fire training/drills for all new mission personnel
- Conduct "Safe and secure approaches in field environments" training for a total of 200 staff members

Property management

- Monitoring and reporting of all key performance indicators with specific reference to a 100 per cent physical verification of all United Nations-owned equipment and the disposal of all written-off assets, including hazardous materials, in full compliance with rules and regulations and in an environmentally safe and protective manner
- Identify any drawdown surplus inventory holdings

Training

- Administration and conduct of 81 courses for international staff and 50 courses for national staff
- Conduct of training in preparation for transition activities such as job fairs and assistance with the preparation of resumes

External factors

Supplies, equipment and outsourced services will be delivered as contracted. In addition, activities to be supported are within the Mission mandate and remain constant or have minimal changes

Table 18
Human resources: component 4, support

Civilian staff	International staff						National staff[a]	United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG-ASG	D-2-D-1	P-5-P-4	P-3-P-2	Field Service	Subtotal			
Conduct and Discipline Team									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	2	1	–	3	3	1	7
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Net change (see table 4)	–	–	(2)	(1)	–	(3)	(3)	(1)	(7)
Security Section									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	1	8	43	52	178	2	232
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	1	6	43	50	168	2	220
Net change (see table 19)	–	–	–	(2)	–	(2)	(10)	–	(12)
HIV/AIDS Unit									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	1	–	–	1	1	2	4
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Net change (see table 20)	–	–	(1)	–	–	(1)	(1)	(2)	(4)
Division of Mission Support									
Office of the Chief of Mission Support									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	1	4	8	15	28	26	4	58
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	1	5	7	13	26	26	2	54
Net change (see tables 21, 22, 23 and 24)	–	–	1	(1)	(2)	(2)	–	(2)	(4)
Approved temporary positions[b] 2015/16	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	–	1
Proposed temporary positions[b] 2016/17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Net change (see table 21)	–	(1)	–	–	–	(1)	–	–	(1)
Subtotal									
Approved posts 2015/16		2	4	8	15	29	26	4	59
Proposed posts 2016/17		1	5	7	13	26	26	2	54
Net change (see tables 21; 22, 23 and 24)		(1)	1	(1)	(2)	(3)	–	(2)	(5)
Administrative services									
Approved posts 2015/16	–	–	5	3	17	25	194	10	229
Proposed posts 2016/17	–	–	5	3	14	22	162	9	193
Net change (see tables 25 and 26)	–	–	–	–	(3)	(3)	(32)	(1)	(36)
Integrated Support Services									
Approved 2015/16	–	–	11	22	86	119	434	57	610
Proposed 2016/17	–	–	11	20	78	109	400	51	560
Net change (see tables 27-35)	–	–	–	(2)	(8)	(10)	(34)	(6)	(50)

Civilian staff	International staff: USG-ASG	D-2-D-1	P-5-P-4	P-3-P-2	Field Service	Subtotal	National staff[a]	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Total									
Approved 2015/16	–	2	24	42	161	229	836	76	1 141
Proposed 2016/17	–	1	22	36	148	207	756	64	1 027
Net change	–	(1)	(2)	(6)	(13)	(22)	(80)	(12)	(114)

[a] Includes National Professional Officers and national General Service staff.
[b] Funded under general temporary assistance, in civilian personnel costs.

International staff: *Decrease of 21 posts and 1 temporary position*

National staff: *Decrease of 80 posts*

United Nations Volunteers: *Decrease of 12 positions*

45. The transfer of the Conduct and Discipline Section to executive direction and management is explained in paragraph 24 above.

Table 19
Human resources: Security Section

	Change	Level	Functional title	Post action	Description
Posts					
	-1	P-3	Security Officer	Abolishment	
	-1	P-2	Associate Security Officer		
	-10	NGS	Security Guard		
Net change	**-12**		**(see table 18)**		

46. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the Security Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that 12 posts presented in table 19 be abolished.

Table 20
Human resources: HIV/AIDS Unit

	Change	Level	Functional title	Post action	Description
Posts					
	-1	NPO	HIV/AIDS Officer	Abolishment	
	-2	UNV	HIV/AIDS Officer		
Subtotal	**-3**				
	-1		HIV/AIDS Officer	Redeployment	To Office of the Chief of Mission Support
Subtotal	**-1**				
Net change	**-4**		**(see table 18)**		

47. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the HIV/AIDS Unit will be abolished, retaining only one post that will be integrated with the immediate Office of the Chief of Mission Support. As a result, it is proposed that three posts presented in table 20 be abolished. It is also proposed that one post presented in table 20 be redeployed to provide the relevant internal training and to ensure that confidential HIV/AIDS testing is performed within the Mission.

Office of the Chief of Mission Support

Table 21
Human resources: Immediate Office of the Chief of Mission Support

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Position					
	-1	D-2	Director Mission Support	Abolishment	
Subtotal	-1				
Post	+1	P-4	HIV Adviser	Redeployment	From HIV/AIDS Unit
Subtotal	+1				
Net change	–				

48. The Director of the Mission Support position at the D-2 level was established on a temporary basis in order to strengthen the senior leadership of the Mission following the earthquake. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, it is proposed that the temporary position be abolished. The Mission Support Division will be led by the Chief of Mission Support (formerly Deputy Director of Mission Support) at the D-1 level. The redeployment of one post presented in table 21 is explained in paragraph 47 above.

Table 22
Human resources: Claims Unit

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	P-3	Claims Officer	Abolishment	
	-1	FS	Administrative Assistant		
Subtotal	-2				
	-1	NGS	Office Assistant	Redeployment	To Property Management Section
	-1	UNV	Administrative Officer		
Subtotal	-2				
Net change	-4				

49. In line with the recommendations of the civilian staffing review, as described in paragraph 11 above, the Claims Unit will be integrated into the Property Management Section and will be merged with the Property Survey Unit. In that context, it is proposed that two posts presented in table 22 be redeployed. Furthermore, and considering that the backlog of claims has been substantially reduced, it is also proposed that two posts presented in table 22 be abolished.

Table 23
Human resources: Environmental Compliance Unit

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Post					
	+1	NPO	Environmental Officer	Reassignment	From Transport Section
Net change	**+1**				

50. In line with the recommendations of the civilian staffing review, as described in paragraph 11 above, it is proposed that one post presented in table 23 be reassigned to strengthen the ability of the Mission to manage the disposal of hazardous wastes and written-off property in compliance with the environmental policies of the host country.

Table 24
Human resources: Finance and Budget Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts/positions					
	-1	FS	Finance Assistant	Abolishment	
	-1	UNV	Finance Assistant		
Net change	**-2**				

51. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the Finance and Budget Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that two posts presented in table 24 be abolished.

Administrative services

Table 25
Human resources: Personnel Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-2	FS	Human Resources Assistant	Abolishment	
	-30	NGS	Language Assistants		
	-1	NGS	Human Resources Assistant		
Net change	**-33**				

52. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the Personnel Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that 33 posts presented in table 25 be abolished.

Table 26
Human resources: Procurement Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	FS	Procurement Assistant	Abolishment	
	-1	NGS	Procurement Assistant		
	-1	UNV	Procurement Assistant		
Net change	**-3**				

53. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the Procurement Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that three posts presented in table 26 be abolished.

Integrated Support Services

Table 27
Human resources: Immediate Office of the Chief Integrated Support Services

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	NGS	Driver	Abolishment	
	-1	NGS	Office Assistant		
Net change	**-2**				

54. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as explained in paragraph 10 above, it is proposed that two posts presented in table 27 be abolished.

Table 28
Human resources: Joint Logistics Operations Centre

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	P-3	Logistics Officer	Abolishment	
	-1	P-3	Administrative Officer		
	-2	NGS	Logistics Assistant		
	-2	NGS	Administrative Assistant		
Net change	**-6**				

55. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the Joint Logistics Operations Centre will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that six posts presented in table 28 be abolished.

Table 29
Human resources: Medical Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	NGS	Nurse	Abolishment	
	-2	NGS	Ambulance Driver		
Net change	**-3**				

56. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the Medical Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that three posts presented in table 29 be abolished.

Table 30
Human resources: Property Management Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	FS	Property Control and Inventory Assistant	Abolishment	
	-1	FS	Property Survey Assistant		
	-2	NGS	Property Management Assistant		
	-1	NGS	Property Control and Inventory Assistant		
	-2	NGS	Receiving and Inspection Unit		
Subtotal	**-7**				
	+1	NGS	Office Assistant	Redeployment	From Claims Unit (Office of the Chief of Mission Support)
	+1	UNV	Administrative Officer		
Subtotal	**+2**				
Net change	**-5**				

57. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the Property Management Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that seven posts presented in table 30 be abolished. It is also proposed that two posts presented in table 30 be redeployed as explained in paragraph 49 above.

Integrated Support Services

Table 31
Human resources: Aviation Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	FS	Air Operations Assistant	Conversion	From International Staff to National Officer
	+1	NPO	Air Operations Officer		To NPO from FS
Net change	–				

58. In accordance with the policy of the Mission to empower and promote national staff, and considering the fact that national staff have demonstrated the ability to hold supervisory and managerial responsibilities, it is proposed to convert one international post presented in table 31 into a national staff post.

Table 32
Human resources: Engineering Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts/positions					
	-2	FS	Facilities Management Asset	Abolishment	
	-1	NGS	Administrative Assistant		
	-3	NGS	Electrician		
	-1	NGS	Water and Sanitation Technician		
	-2	NGS	Supply Assistant		
	-1	NGS	Facilities Management Asset		
	-1	UNV	Field Engineer		
	-1	UNV	Warehouse Supervisor		
	-1	UNV	Engineering Assistant		
	-1	UNV	Heating, Ventilation and Air-conditioning Technician		
Net change	-14				

59. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the Engineering Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that 14 posts presented in table 32 be abolished.

Table 33
Human resources: Transport Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	FS	Vehicle Technician	Abolishment	
	-1	NPO	Transport Officer		
	-2	NGS	Vehicle Technician		
	-3	NGS	Driver		
Subtotal	-7				
	-1	NPO	Road Safety Instructor	Reassignment	To Environmental Unit (Office of the Director of Mission Support) as Environmental Officer
Subtotal	-1				
Net change	-8				

60. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the Transport Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that seven posts presented in table 33 be abolished. It is also proposed that one post presented in table 33 be reassigned as explained in paragraph 50 above.

Table 34
Human resources: Communications and Information Technology Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts/positions					
	-2	FS	Information Systems Assistant	Abolishment	
	-1	NGS	Telecommunications Technician Assistant		
	-1	NGS	IT Assistant		
	-1	UNV	IT Assistant		
	-1	UNV	Cabling Technician		
	-1	UNV	Telephone Billing Assistant		
Net change	-7				

61. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 10 above, the Communications and Information Technology Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that seven posts presented in table 34 be abolished.

Table 35
Human resources: Supply Section

	Change	*Level*	*Functional title*	*Post action*	*Description*
Posts					
	-1	**NGS**	**Fuel Assistant**	**Abolishment**	
	-1	**NGS**	**Ration Assistant**		
	-3	**NGS**	**Supply Assistant**		
Net change	**-5**				

62. In the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission, as described in paragraph 11 above, the Supply Section will be consolidated. As a result, it is proposed that five posts presented in table 35 be abolished.

II. Financial resources

A. Overall

(Thousands of United States dollars: budget year is 1 July to 30 June.)

Category	Expenditures (2014/15)	Apportionment (2015/16)	Cost estimates (2016/17)	Variance	
				Amount	Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)=(3)-(2)	(5)=(4)÷(2)
Military and police personnel					
Military observers	–	–	–	–	–
Military contingents	161 796.4	70 089.6	72 541.7	2 452.1	3.5
United Nations police	42 266.5	51 088.1	50 381.4	(706.7)	(1.4)
Formed police units	47 777.7	52 445.9	51 388.4	(1 057.5)	(2.0)
Subtotal	**251 840.6**	**173 623.6**	**174 311.5**	**687.9**	**0.4**
Civilian personnel					
International staff	68 126.0	69 655.7	57 286.3	(12 369.4)	(17.8)
National staff	34 334.5	28 749.0	20 874.4	(7 874.6)	(27.4)
United Nations Volunteers	6 624.8	5 969.5	6 052.0	82.5	1.4
General temporary assistance	698.4	320.8	–	(320.8)	(100.0)
Government-provided personnel	2 292.7	3 080.6	2 920.2	(160.4)	(5.2)
Subtotal	**112 076.4**	**107 775.6**	**87 132.9**	**(20 642.7)**	**(19.2)**
Operational costs					
Civilian electoral observers	–	–	–	–	–
Consultants	1 299.4	1 777.0	1 300.3	(476.7)	(26.8)
Official travel	2 765.6	3 542.0	2 732.6	(809.4)	(22.9)
Facilities and infrastructure	37 804.2	42 844.6	39 263.5	(3 581.1)	(8.4)
Ground transportation	6 710.3	6 743.1	4 532.6	(2 210.5)	(32.8)
Air transportation	11 349.0	11 918.9	8 156.0	(3 762.9)	(31.6)
Naval transportation	292.3	310.1	–	(310.1)	(100.0)
Communications	7 758.9	9 317.3	7 092.1	(2 225.2)	(23.9)
Information technology	10 700.6	6 934.4	5 777.3	(1 157.1)	(16.7)
Medical	1 090.7	1 587.3	1 565.1	(22.2)	(1.4)
Special equipment	–	–	–	–	–
Other supplies, services and equipment	24 484.9	9 981.8	12 062.8	2 081.0	20.8
Quick-impact projects	4 959.0	4 000.0	3 000.0	(1 000.0)	(25.0)
Subtotal	**109 214.9**	**98 956.5**	**85 482.3**	**(13 474.2)**	**(13.6)**
Gross requirements	**473 131.9**	**380 355.7**	**346 926.7**	**(33 429.0)**	**(8.8)**
Staff assessment income	11 423.8	10 809.3	8 406.5	(2 402.8)	(22.2)
Net requirements	**461 708.1**	**369 546.4**	**338 520.2**	**(31 026.2)**	**(8.4)**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	–	–	–	–	–
Total requirements	**473 131.9**	**380 355.7**	**346 926.7**	**(33 429.0)**	**(8.8)**

B. Non-budgeted contributions

63. The estimated value of non-budgeted contributions for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 is as follows:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	*Estimated value*
Status-of-forces agreement[a]	7 238.4
Voluntary contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	
Total	**7 238.4**

[a] Represents estimated rental value of Government-provided land and premises as well as the waivers of departure/airport taxes, landing fees and customs duties.

C. Efficiency gains

64. The cost estimates for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 take into account the following efficiency initiatives:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	*Amount*	*Initiative*
Engineering	12.0	Utilization of in-house resources (United Nations-owned sewage trucks) in collection and disposal of wastewater instead of using contracted personnel
Engineering	21.0	The segregation and recycling of garbage from civilian, military and police compounds as part of the solid waste management plan is estimated to reduce approximately 1,300 m^3 of solid waste to be collected by the contractor for disposal
Commercial communications	384.0	Substantial improvements to a complex microwave backbone ring and VSAT network optimization will allow for a reduction of the reliance of the Mission on a satellite service, which will lead to savings of $22,000 per month. Further savings of $10,000 per month will be achieved as a result of the streamlining of mobile telephone and data services. These enhancements will provide an overall savings of $384,000 under commercial communications services
Total	**417.0**	

D. Vacancy factors

65. The cost estimates for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 take into account the following vacancy factors:

(Percentage)

Category	*Actual 2014/15*	*Budgeted 2015/16*	*Projected 2016/17*
Military and police personnel			
Military contingents	9.7	3.0	3.0
United Nations police	27.2	10.0	12.0
Formed police units	1.7	3.0	–
Civilian personnel			
International staff	16.1	10.0	13.0
National staff			
National Professional Officers	13.0	4.0	16.0
National General Service staff	6.7	4.0	11.0
United Nations Volunteers	16.3	5.0	10.0
Government-provided personnel	18.0	3.0	8.0

66. The proposed vacancy factors for military and police personnel take into account recent deployment patterns. The proposed vacancy factors for civilian personnel take into account current fiscal year-to-date average rates, historical incumbency patterns and proposed staffing changes.

E. Contingent-owned equipment: major equipment and self-sustainment

67. Requirements for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 are based on standard reimbursement rates for major equipment and self-sustainment in the total amount of $30,519,000 as follows:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Estimated amount		
Category	*Military contingents*	*Formed police units*	***Total***
Major equipment	14 209.3	8 266.0	**22 475.3**
Self-sustainment	4 994.2	3 049.5	**8 043.7**
Total	**19 203.5**	**11 315.5**	**30 519.0**

Mission factors	*Percentage*	*Effective date*	*Last review date*
A. Applicable to Mission area			
Extreme environmental condition factor	1.1	1 June 2004	–
Intensified operational condition factor	1.3	1 June 2004	–
Hostile action/forced abandonment factor	1.0	1 June 2004	–
B. Applicable to home country			
Incremental transportation factor	0.25-5.75		

F. Training

68. The estimated resource requirements for training for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 are as follows:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	*Estimated amount*
Consultants	
Training consultants	**254.3**
Official travel	
Official travel, training	**573.6**
Other supplies, services and equipment	
Training fees, supplies and services	**421.5**
Total	**1 249.4**

69. The number of participants planned for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, compared to 2014/15 and 2015/16, is as follows:

(Number of participants)

	International staff			*National staff*			*Military and police personnel*		
	Actual 2014/15	*Planned 2015/16*	*Proposed 2016/17*	*Actual 2014/15*	*Planned 2015/16*	*Proposed 2016/17*	*Actual 2014/15*	*Planned 2015/16*	*Proposed 2016/17*
Internal	**669**	**1 372**	**823**	**1 911**	**3 189**	**2 028**	**1 695**	**2 170**	**597**
External[a]	**73**	**59**	**55**	**22**	**26**	**28**	**4**	**3**	**–**
Total	**742**	**1 431**	**878**	**1 933**	**3 215**	**2 056**	**1 699**	**2 173**	**597**

[a] Includes United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi (UNLB) and outside the Mission area.

70. The training requirements for the 2016/17 period will decrease compared with the 2015/16 period. The decrease is attributable to the proposed reductions in civilian personnel in the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission. Training will cover a variety of topics, including but not limited to human resources management/ development, humanitarian issues, administration, budget, finance and security.

G. Community violence reduction programme

71. The estimated resource requirements for community violence reduction programme for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 are as follows:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	*Estimated value*
Other supplies, services and equipment	
Other services	5 000.0
Total	**5 000.0**

72. During the 2016/17 period, MINUSTAH will focus on leveraging its traditional areas of expertise to provide assistance to the development of security sector and rule of law institutions. In addition, the Mission will focus on building the capacity of target communities and national entities to manage programmes that lead to the reduction of community violence. MINUSTAH will focus on planning the eventual handover of the management of community violence reduction programmes to national entities, with support from the United Nations country team, as appropriate.

73. In order to ensure a responsible and sustainable transfer of programming and expertise to national entities, the community violence reduction programme would require an operational budget of $5 million to deepen and broaden partnerships with the entities that will assume operational and programmatic responsibility for community engagement in violence-affected urban areas, without creating a dangerous vacuum that would risk undoing essential security and development gains achieved since the inception of the programme.

74. The Mission will develop and implement 29 projects, in collaboration with ministries, local authorities, community groups and leaders, and the United Nations country team, as follows: (a) five high labour-intensive and income generating projects for at-risk youth, men and women in crime affected areas of Cap-Haïtien or Port-au-Prince; (b) three security and stabilization projects providing a safer environment in crime affected areas of Cap-Haïtien or Port-au-Prince; (c) three professional skills training projects for at-risk youth and prison inmates in Cap-Haïtien and/or Port-au-Prince; (d) three gender-based violence prevention and child protection projects for female victims of violence and youth at risk of drug and alcohol abuse in Cap-Haïtien and/or Port-au-Prince; (e) four employment and entrepreneurship projects for 500 youth and women in Cap-Haïtien and/or Port-au-Prince; (f) five projects to support the national legal aid system in addressing prolonged pretrial detention, gender-based violence, child protection and civil status for beneficiaries in Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes; (g) one public outreach and community mediation project in support of community forums and fostering coordination between local authorities and communities; (h) two sensitization and social mobilization campaign for violence reduction in Cap-Haïtien or Port-au-Prince; and (i) three monitoring and evaluation projects focusing on the community violence reduction programme and compilation of lessons learned and best practices.

H. Quick-impact projects

75. The estimated resource requirements for quick-impact projects for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, compared to previous periods, are as follows:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Period	*Amount*	*Number of projects*
1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 (actual)	4 959.0	113
1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 (approved)	4 000.0	80
1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 (proposed)	3 000.0	60

76. In the context of the consolidation of the Mission, where MINUSTAH is expected to continue to reduce its footprint, the quick-impact projects programme remains of key importance in this transition phase. The programme will ease the impact of the withdrawal of the Mission and facilitate the transfer of competencies to Haitian authorities, United Nations agencies and other donors.

77. For the 2016/2017 period, through the implementation of 60 proposed projects, MINUSTAH will continue to strengthen State capacities to provide basic public services to the population, reinforce rule of law structures, support civil society engagement in good governance and provide opportunities to foster democracy. The programme will enable the Mission to improve key infrastructure, thus enabling Haitian institutions to better exercise their authority. In addition, the programme will continue to be a relevant tool to support the efforts of the Government to provide public services, in particular by facilitating access to potable water for millions of Haitians. Furthermore, through livelihood opportunities and income generation projects that aim at strengthening small agriculture and social entrepreneurship initiatives, the programme will contribute to economic stability. The reduced requirements for the quick-impact projects programme are attributable to the ongoing consolidation of the Mission.

III. Analysis of variances[1]

78. The standard terminology applied with respect to the analysis of resources variances in this section are defined in annex I B of the present report. The terminology used remains the same as in previous reports.

	Variance	
Military contingents	$2 452.1	3.5%

- **Management: additional inputs and same outputs**

79. The increased requirements are attributable primarily to the anticipated improvement in the serviceability of contingent-owned equipment and the impact of the single rate of reimbursement of $1,365 for standard troop costs, approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 68/281, compared with the rate of $1,332 applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period. The increased requirements are offset in part by lower reimbursement rates for contingent-owned equipment self-sustainment based on the current memorandum of understanding.

[1] Resource variance amounts are expressed in thousands of United States dollars. Analysis is provided for variances of at least plus or minus 5 per cent or $100,000.

	Variance	
United Nations police	($706.7)	(1.4%)

• **Management: reduced inputs and same outputs**

80. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to the application of a vacancy factor of 12 per cent in the computation of travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation costs, compared with the factor of 10 per cent applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period and the anticipated lower number of rotations, compared with the number of rotations included in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period.

	Variance	
Formed police units	($1 057.5)	(2.0%)

• **Management: reduced inputs and same outputs**

81. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to the lower reimbursement rates for contingent-owned self-sustainment equipment based on the current memorandum of understanding. The reduced requirements are offset in part by the fact that no vacancy factor was applied in the computation of travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation, rations and daily allowance costs, compared with the factor of 3 per cent applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period; as well as the impact of the single rate of reimbursement of $1,365 for standard formed police costs, approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 68/281, compared with the rate of $1,332 applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period.

	Variance	
International staff	($12 369.4)	(17.8%)

• **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

82. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to: (a) the proposed abolishment of 31 international posts in the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission; (b) a decrease in salary rates compared with the rates applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period; and (c) the application of a vacancy factor of 13 per cent in the computation of international staff salary costs, compared with the factor of 10 per cent applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period.

	Variance	
National staff	($7 874.6)	(27.4%)

• **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

83. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to the proposed abolishment of 123 national posts in the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission and the application of a vacancy factor of 16 per cent for National Professional Officers and 11 per cent for national General Services staff in the computation of national staff salary costs, compared with the factor of 4 per cent applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period.

	Variance	
United Nations Volunteers	**$82.5**	**1.4%**

- **Management: increased inputs and same outputs**

84. The increased requirements are attributable primarily to the anticipated higher non-recurring costs and programme support costs based on the revised conditions of service for the United Nations Volunteers. The increased requirements are offset in part by the proposed abolishment of 22 United Nations Volunteers positions, in the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission and the application of a vacancy factor of 10 per cent in the computation of United Nations Volunteers living allowances and other recurring costs, compared with the factor of 5 per cent applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period.

	Variance	
General temporary assistance	**($320.8)**	**(100%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

85. The reduced requirements are attributable to the proposed abolishment of one international position in the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission.

	Variance	
Government-provided personnel	**($160.4)**	**(5.2%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

86. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to the application of a vacancy factor of 8 per cent in the computation of mission subsistence allowance as well as travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation costs, compared with the factor of 3 per cent applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period.

	Variance	
Consultants	**($476.7)**	**(26.8%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

87. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to the non-requirement for consultancy services to support the Government of Haiti, in line with the ongoing disengagement from traditional institutional support and capacity-building activities in the context of the downsizing of the Mission.

	Variance	
Official travel	**($809.4)**	**(22.9%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

88. The reduced requirements are attributable to lower requirements for official travel-non training compared with the estimates included in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period as a result of the proposed reduction in civilian staffing levels and the closure of two regional offices, in the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission.

	Variance	
Facilities and infrastructure	**($3 581.1)**	**(8.4%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

89. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to the non-requirement for engineering supplies. The current inventory is adequate to meet all the remaining requirements, in line with the ongoing downsizing of the Mission. In addition, the reduced requirements are attributable to the proposed reduction in civilian staffing levels, the closure of two regional offices and the use of in-house resources for photocopying and printing services. The reduced requirements are offset, in part, by: (a) the anticipated higher price of $0.68 per litre for fuel, compared with $0.55 per litre applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period; (b) a 12.7 per cent increase in the share of the fuel maintenance fee budgeted under facilities and infrastructure compared with the share of the fee applied in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period; and (c) the increase in the rental costs for leased properties in Port-au-Prince.

	Variance	
Ground transportation	**($2 210.5)**	**(32.8%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

90. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to the anticipated consumption of fuel of 3.0 million litres, compared with 3.4 million litres included in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period and lower maintenance costs compared with the estimates included in the approved budget for the 2015/16 budget as a result of the reduction in the fleet of the Mission, in line with the ongoing downsizing of the Mission.

	Variance	
Air transportation	**($3 762.9)**	**(31.6%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

91. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to the anticipated lower number of 2,100 flying hours, compared with 2,850 flying hours included in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period, in the context of the ongoing downsizing of the Mission.

	Variance	
Naval transportation	**($310.1)**	**(100.0%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

92. The reduced requirements are attributable to the closure of naval operations in the Mission, following the repatriation of the six Zodiac boats in line with the ongoing downsizing of the Mission.

	Variance	
Communications	**($2 225.2)**	**(23.9%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

93. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to: (a) fewer anticipated broadcasting, printing and reproduction materials in line with the ongoing disengagement and downsizing of the Mission; (b) lower requirements for satellite transponder bandwidth, Internet services and leased lines as a result of the proposed reduction in civilian staffing levels and the closure of two regional offices; (c) the optimization of the use of mobile phone services through the reduction of credit limits and the cancellation of the data-roaming feature for a large number of personnel; and (d) the non-requirement for indirect support costs for Umoja compared with the estimates included in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period.

	Variance	
Information technology	**($1 157.1)**	**(16.7%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

94. The reduced requirements are attributable primarily to lower requirements for information technology services as a result of the proposed reduction in civilian staffing levels and the closure of two regional offices as well as the non-requirement for indirect support costs for Umoja compared with the estimates included in the approved budget for the 2015/16 period. The reduced requirements are offset in part by the increased requirements for spare parts for old equipment and the increased requirements for supplies as a result of the use of in-house resources for photocopying and printing services.

	Variance	
Other supplies, services and equipment	**$2 081.0**	**20.8%**

- **Management: Additional inputs and same outputs**

95. The increased requirements are primarily attributable to the anticipated undertaking of substantive activities in line with the implementation plan of the Secretary-General on the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people (A/70/95-S/2015/446). The expected outcome of the additional activities will be to: (a) promote a political environment more conducive to the establishment of the rule of law; (b) improve safety and security environment throughout Haiti; (c) promote a more effective, efficient and transparent judicial system which respects human rights; and (d) improve access to justice through service provision and legal awareness. The increased requirements are offset in part by the reduced requirements for community violence reduction programmes in line with the ongoing downsizing of the Mission.

	Variance	
Other supplies, services and equipment	**($1 000)**	**(25.0%)**

- **Management: reduced inputs and outputs**

96. The reduced requirements are primarily attributable to the anticipated reduction in the number of quick-impact projects supported to 60, from 80, in line with the ongoing downsizing of the Mission.

IV. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

97. **The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti are:**

(a) **Appropriation of the amount of $346,926,700 for the maintenance of the Mission for the 12-month period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017;**

(b) **Assessment of the amount of $101,187,000 for the period from 1 July 2016 to 15 October 2016;**

(c) **Assessment of the amount of $245,739,700 for the period from 16 October 2016 to 30 June 2017, should the Security Council decide to continue the mandate of the Mission.**

V. Summary of follow-up action taken to implement the decisions and requests of the General Assembly in its resolution 69/307 and 69/299, including the requests and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, as endorsed by the General Assembly

A. General Assembly

Cross-cutting issues

(Resolution 69/307)

Decision/request	*Action taken to implement decision/request*
Requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to reduce the overall environmental footprint of each peacekeeping mission, including by implementing environmentally friendly waste management and power generation systems, in full compliance with the relevant rules and regulations, including, but not limited to, the United Nations environmental and waste management policy and procedures (para. 28)	MINUSTAH will review its environmental policy to integrate provisions of the newly promulgated waste management policy for field missions. The Mission will continue to conduct environmental briefings and carry out inspections at all Mission sites. The implementation of the recommendations will be closely monitored. The Mission will also replace non-environment friendly air conditioners to comply with non-chlorofluorocarbon regulations and has started to install stand-alone solar lights within Mission sites and offices
Encourages the Secretary-General to utilize local materials, capacity and knowledge in the implementation of construction projects for peacekeeping operations, in compliance with the United Nations Procurement Manual (para. 31)	The Mission utilizes local materials and capacity for its projects, where possible. The most recent construction project of the Mission was undertaken by a local contractor. To enhance the capacity and knowledge in the management of construction projects within the Mission, National Professional Officers are assigned to construction projects under the supervision of international staff. Engineering staff have also attended project management and occupational health and safety training sessions
Requests the Secretary-General to strengthen oversight and internal controls in the areas of procurement and asset management across peacekeeping missions, including by holding mission management accountable for checking stock levels before undertaking any acquisition activity in order to ensure compliance with established asset management policies, taking into account the current and future needs of the mission and the importance of the full implementation of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (para. 33)	MINUSTAH section managers verify stock levels and make enquiries to the United Nations Global Service Centre on the status of available stock before raising requisitions. In order to strengthen oversight and internal control in the area of procurement and asset management, MINUSTAH has revised its requisition form to reflect available stock. The new form includes the fields to indicate the quantity and value of current stock. In addition, quarterly reviews are undertaken by the Procurement Section to verify commitments against the total amounts available for the specific expenditure to determine any underexpenditure or overexpenditure for each line item in the acquisition plan

Decision request	*Action taken to implement decision request*
Also requests the Secretary-General to present in his budget proposals a clear vision of the construction requirements for each mission, including, as appropriate, multi-year plans, and to continue his efforts to improve all aspects of project planning, including the assumptions underlying the formulation of such budgets, with due consideration of operational circumstances on the ground, and to closely monitor the execution of works to ensure their timely completion (para. 36)	The MINUSTAH Engineering Section based its budget proposals for construction projects on the operational requirements of the Mission. The ongoing major rehabilitation of existing facilities is based on the reconfiguration and relocation of camps and regional offices. The completion of projects is closely monitored by a qualified site engineer who carries out on-site supervision on daily basis and will submit progress reports on a weekly basis until the completion of the project
Recalls paragraphs 137 and 143 of the report of the Advisory Committee, welcomes the ongoing roll-out of the aviation information management system across all peacekeeping operations with aviation assets, and looks forward to further reporting on the improvements realized in air operations (para. 37)	MINUSTAH has implemented the aviation information management system. The data for air operations has been entered into the system starting from June 2015. The Mission has been generating reports from the system since September 2015. There are still some technical glitches in the system, however, that the Air Transport Section in Headquarters, in collaboration with the project manager at UNLB, are trying to resolve by establishing weekly teleconferencing meetings with all the Missions. It is therefore too early to report on any realized improvement at this time
Recalls paragraph 147 of the report of the Advisory Committee [A/69/839], requests the Secretary-General to ensure consistency, transparency and cost-efficiency in the budgeting for unmanned aerial systems in individual peacekeeping operation budget proposals in this regard, including by presenting expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement, as well as information on outputs, as appropriate, in the context of the results-based-budgeting framework (para. 39)	MINUSTAH does not have any unmanned aerial systems in its aviation fleet
Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the availability of easily accessible reporting mechanisms for victims of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (para. 51)	MINUSTAH has established a hotline and an e-mail address to report allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. These contact details are available on the website of the Mission and on conduct and discipline posters and are communicated to the mass media, local communities, non-government organizations, community leaders and the general public through MINUSTAH outreach programmes. The information is provided in Haitian Creole, French, English and Spanish. During assessment visits to the region, the MINUSTAH Conduct and Discipline Team educates local non-government organizations and community leaders on procedures for filing a complaint about the misconduct by United Nations personnel

Decision/request	*Action taken to implement decision/request*
Requests the Secretary-General to make further efforts to ensure that all personnel are made fully aware of, and remain compliant with, their personal responsibilities regarding the Organization's policy of zero tolerance, upon their arrival in the mission and throughout their deployment (para. 54)	All newly deployed personnel (civilian, police and military) at the Mission must sign an undertaking consistent with the provisions of the Secretary-General's bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 immediately upon joining. All MINUSTAH uniformed personnel receive individual pocket cards in their national languages recapping the provisions of the bulletin. All MINUSTAH personnel receive induction training upon joining the Mission on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse. Refresher training activities on these matters are conducted regularly. Specific training activities are conducted for managers, commanders and conduct and discipline focal points on the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse. The Mission has established a list of out-of-bounds locations in all regions of Haiti, which is enforced by periodic security inspections. Violators are held accountable. The Conduct and Discipline Team conducts regular field assessment visits to all locations in Haiti where the military and police contingents are deployed. MINUSTAH conducts a continuous awareness raising campaign on sexual exploitation and abuse and the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse through posters placed within MINUSTAH premises and through the Mission intranet. The campaign is conducted in all languages widely spoken at the Mission

(Resolution 69/299)

Decision/request	*Action taken to implement decision/request*
Commends the Mission for its efforts to prepare national staff for the transitional period by conducting training and hosting job fairs, encourages the Mission to continue to assist national staff in their transition to future professional careers outside the Mission, and requests the Secretary-General to report on progress made in this regard (para. 8)	Career-transition training was systematically conducted for all staff affected by the downsizing of the Mission. MINUSTAH will continue to assist national staff in the transition to their future professional careers outside the Mission by implementing the national staff capacity building programme. Training to equip national staff members with the required skills is ongoing in cooperation with section chiefs (including United Nations Volunteers) to transfer their knowledge in their area of expertise to national staff

Decision request	*Action taken to implement decision/request*
Also commends the Mission for its role in the pilot phase of Extension 1 of the enterprise resource planning system, Umoja, and requests the Secretary-General to include information on the gains resulting from its implementation in subsequent budget proposals (para. 9)	**Umoja Extension 1 is gradually bringing long-term benefits, including streamlined business processes, reduced time spent on administrative processes, harmonized use of administrative data and information and self-service for staff and managers. Overall, travel and human resources processes and service delivery have been significantly improved and are becoming automated and more efficient**
Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place to handle medical and casualty evacuation cases to level IV hospitals, and to report thereon in the context of the budget proposal for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 (para. 14)	**MINUSTAH has been working with the Department of Field Support on a level IV hospital statement of work. Technical clearance was granted by the Logistics Support Division/Strategic Support Service/Medical Support Section at Headquarters, and a local procurement authority has been approved by the Procurement Division at Headquarters to launch a bidding exercise that allows commitment to a contract with a level IV hospital**

B. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

Cross-cutting issues

(A/69/839/Add.4)

Request/recommendation	*Action taken to implement request/recommendation*
The Advisory Committee was informed that Extension 1 of the enterprise resource planning system, Umoja, was successfully deployed on 1 July 2014 in MINUSTAH, which played a pilot role in the matter and included the modules of human resources, travel and payroll. However, challenges remain regarding training and support capacities, and change management. The Mission is working closely with the Department of Field Support and the Umoja team in New York to address those challenges. According to the information provided, Extension 1 is scheduled to be implemented in phases in all missions between June and November 2015. **The Advisory Committee commends MINUSTAH for its role in the early implementation of Umoja and recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to include information on the efficiency gains resulting from the implementation of Umoja Extension 1 in subsequent budget proposals** (para. 48)	**Umoja Extension 1 is gradually bringing long-term benefits, including streamlined business processes, reduced time spent on administrative processes, harmonized use of administrative data and information and self-service for staff and managers. Overall travel and human resources processes and service delivery have been significantly improved and are becoming automated and more efficient**

Annex I

Definitions

A. Terminology related to proposed changes in human resources

The following terminology has been applied with respect to proposed changes in human resources (see section I.E):

- **Post establishment**: a new post is proposed to be established when additional resources are necessary and when it is not possible to redeploy resources from other offices or otherwise accommodate specific activities from within existing resources.
- **Post reassignment**: an approved post that was intended to cover a certain function is proposed to implement other priority mandated activities unrelated to the original function. While a post reassignment may involve a change of location or office, it does not change the category or level of the post.
- **Post redeployment**: an approved post is proposed to be redeployed to cover comparable or related functions in another office.
- **Post reclassification**: an approved post is proposed to be reclassified (upgraded or downgraded) when the duties and responsibilities of the post have changed substantially.
- **Post abolishment**: an approved post is proposed to be abolished if it is no longer needed to implement the activities for which it was approved or to implement other priority mandated activities within the mission.
- **Post conversion**: three possible options for post conversion are as follows:
  - Conversion of general temporary assistance positions to posts: approved positions financed under general temporary assistance are proposed for conversion to posts if the functions being performed are of a continuing nature.
  - Conversion of individual contractors or individuals on procurement contracts to national staff posts: taking into account the continuing nature of certain functions, in line with section VIII, paragraph 11, of General Assembly resolution 59/296, individual contractors or individuals on procurement contracts are proposed for conversion to national staff posts.
  - Conversion of international staff posts to national staff posts: approved international staff posts are proposed for conversion to national staff posts.

B. Terminology related to variance analysis

Section III of the present report indicates the single largest contributing factor of each resource variance according to specific standard options encompassed in the four standard categories listed below:

- **Mandate**: variances caused by changes in the scale or scope of the mandate, or changes in the expected accomplishments as driven by the mandate
- **External**: variances caused by parties or situations external to the United Nations
- **Cost parameters**: variances caused by United Nations regulations, rules and policies
- **Management**: variances caused by management actions to achieve planned results more effectively (e.g. by reprioritizing or adding certain outputs) or efficiently (e.g. by taking measures to reduce personnel or operational inputs while maintaining the same level of outputs) and/or from performance-related issues (e.g. by having underestimated the costs or quantities of inputs required to produce a certain level of outputs, or by delayed recruitment)

Annex II

Organization charts

A. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti


Political Affairs Section (15 posts)
1 D-1, 1 P-5, 4 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 FS, 3 NPO, 3 NGS
Legal Affairs Office (7 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 FS, 1 NPO, 1 NGS
Joint Mission Analysis Centre (6 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-3, 1 FS, 2 UNV
Joint Operations Centre (7 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 NPO, 1 UNV
Conduct and Discipline Section (7 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-2, 2 NPO, 1 NGS, 1 UNV
Regional Coordination (2 posts)
2 P-5
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (USG)
(17 posts)
1 USG, 1 D-1, 2 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 2 FS,
2 NPO, 6 NGS
Communications and Public Information Section
(50 posts)
1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 5 FS, 9 NPO,
30 NGS, 1 UNV
Security Section
(220 posts)
1 P-4, 6 P-3, 43 FS, 168 NGS, 2 UNV
Gender Unit
(6 posts)
1 P-5, 3 NPO, 1 NGS, 1 UNV
Division of Mission Support
(807 posts)
1 D-1, 3 P-5, 18 P-4, 30 P-3, 105 FS, 21 NPO,
1 NPO,[b] 1 NPO,[c] 565 NGS, 62 UNV
Office of the Deputy
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(Political and Rule of Law)
(14 posts)
1 ASG, 1 D-2, 1 P-5, 1 P-5,[a] 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-3,[a] 1 P-2, 1 FS, 4 NGS, 1 UNV
Office of the Force Commander
(4 posts)
1 D-2, 1 FS, 2 NGS
Office of the Deputy
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator)
(10 posts)
1 ASG, 1 P-5,[a] 1 P-4, 1 FS, 2 NPO, 4 NGS
Accountability, Institutional Support and Law Reform Section
(10 posts)
1 P-5,[b] 2 P-4,[b] 5 NPO,[b] 2 NGS[b]
Model Jurisdictions Section
(10 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 9 NPO, 4 NGS,
2 UNV
Corrections Unit
(10 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-3, 2 NPO, 4 NGS, 1 UNV
Office of the Police Commissioner
(32 posts)
1 D-2, 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 4 P-4, 1 FS,
1 NPO, 15 NGS, 8 UNV
Border Management Unit (5 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 NPO, 1 NGS
Human Rights Section (32 posts)
1 D-1, 1 P-5, 3 P-4, 5 P-3, 2 P-2,
10 NPO, 7 NGS, 3 UNV
Community Violence Reduction Section
(30 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 FS, 11 NPO, 9 NGS,
5 UNV
Civil Affairs Section
(35 posts)
1 P-5, 2 P-4, 5 P-3, 2 P-2, 1 FS,
16 NPO, 4 NGS, 4 UNV
Child Protection Unit
(1 post)
1 P-4

Abbreviations: USG; Under-Secretary-General; ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; FS, Field Service; NPO, National Professional Officer; NGS, national General Service; UNV, United Nations Volunteer.

[a] Reassignment.

[b] Redeployment.

[c] Conversion.

B. Mission Support Division


Office of the Chief of Mission Support
(11 posts)
1 D-1, 1-P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-4,[b] 3 P-3, 1 FS, 1 NPO, 1 NGS
Contracts Management Unit
(4 posts)
1 P3, 1 FS, 2 NGS
Environmental Compliance Unit
(4 posts)
1 P-3, 1 NPO,[a] 2 UNV
Finance and Budget Section
(35 posts)
1 P-4, 2 P-3, 11 FS, 1 NPO, 20 NGS
Office of Chief, Integrated Support Services
(5 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 NGS
Office of Chief, Administrative Services
(15 posts)
1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 FS, 2 NPO, 5 NGS, 5 UNV
Joint Logistics Operations Centre
(27 posts)
1 P-4, 5 P-3, 4 FS, 3 NPO,
14 NGS
Property Management Section
(39 posts)
1 P-4, 3 P-3, 8 FS, 1 NPO, 23 NGS,
3 UNV
Personnel Section
(156 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 9 FS, 1 NPO,
143 NGS, 1 UNV
Procurement Section
(17 posts)
1 P-4, 2 P-3, 4 FS, 3 NPO,
5 NGS, 2 UNV
Aviation Section
(25 posts)
1 P-4, 3 P-3, 4 FS, 1 NPO,
1 NPO,[c] 14 NGS, 1 UNV
Engineering Section
(94 posts)
1 P-4, 3 P-3, 13 FS, 3 NPO, 64 NGS,
10 UNV
Staff Counseling and Welfare
(5 posts)
1 P-4, 1 NPO, 2 NGS, 1 UNV
Transport Section
(158 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 12 FS, 1 NPO,
128 NGS, 15 UNV
Communications and Information Technology Section
(96 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 23 FS, 1 NPO, 57 NGS,
13 UNV
Movement Control Section
(36 posts)
1 P-4, 5 FS, 1 NPO, 27 NGS,
2 UNV
Supply Section
(48 posts)
1 P-4, 2 P-3, 8 FS, 1 NPO, 35 NGS, 1 UNV
Medical Section
(32 posts)
1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 FS, 23 NGS, 6 UNV

Abbreviations: FS, Field Service; NPO, National Professional Officer; NGS, national General Service; UNV, United Nations Volunteer.

[a] Reassignment.

[b] Redeployment.

[c] Conversion.

Annex III

Information on funding provisions and activities of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes

Priorities	*Outcomes*	*Outputs*	*Lead, partners, mechanism*
Institutional rebuilding Contribute to the consolidation of the rule of law through improved democratic governance, support to the reform of public administration, the implementation of a consensus legislative agenda and the strengthening of civil society	*Justice and rule of law* On the basis of a mutual commitment between the United Nations and Haitian authorities, national institutions, including those responsible for the rule of law, are further strengthened in order to perform the duties of public administration and provide basic services	• The Judicial Inspectorate of the Superior Council of the Judiciary is established and the certification of judges is completed. Renewal of mandates of the members of the Council is performed without any negative impact on its functioning and nominated members of the Council are, at a minimum, 30 per cent female	Lead: UNDP Partners: MINUSTAH (rule of law, civil affairs, political affairs human rights) Ministry of Justice and Public Security and Superior Council of the Judiciary Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
	Control and accountability mechanisms are strengthened, including the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the Court of Cassation, the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police, the Office for the Protection of Citizens, the Judicial Inspectorate, the Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes, with due respect for international norms of human rights and gender equality	• The development plan of the Inspectorate General of the Haitian National Police is implemented • By the end of 2017, 98 per cent of all complaints of human rights violations received by the Office for Protection of Citizens and judged valid are resolved and closed • Annual inspections are held by the Judicial Inspectorate of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security	MINUSTAH (United Nations police) Partners: OHCHR Haitian National Police Inspectorate General Mechanism: integrated strategic framework OHCHR Partners: MINUSTAH (Human rights) Office for the Protection of Citizens Mechanism: integrated strategic framework Lead: UNDP Partners: MINUSTAH Ministry of Justice and Public Security Mechanism: integrated strategic framework

Priorities	*Outcomes*	*Outputs*	*Lead, partners, mechanism*
		• Capacity of the Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes allows for the hearing of cases and the issuance of decisions on an annual basis	Lead: UNDP Partners: MINUSTAH Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
		• In the three model jurisdictions, the number of hearings increases to 600 per year. Legal offices are functional in Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes	
On the basis of mutual agreement of the United Nations and Haitian authorities, national institutions, including rule-of-law institutions, are reinforced in order to fulfil the functions of public administration and the provision of basic services	The public service is gradually modernized and the promotion of women to positions of high responsibility is encouraged	• The action plan for reform of the State is implemented in key ministries and entities	Lead: UNDP Partners: MINUSTAH (civil affairs, human rights, gender) UN-Women, UNICEF, UN-Habitat Government of Haiti Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
		• An increasing number of women are appointed to senior civil servant positions	United Nations country team (UNDP, UN-Women, UNICEF, UN-Habitat) Government of Haiti (Office of the President, Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Ministry of Women's Affairs and Women's Rights, Office for the Protection of Citizens, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Institute for Social Welfare and Research, Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities) Mechanism: integrated strategic framework

Priorities	*Outcomes*	*Outputs*	*Lead, partners, mechanism*
	Implementation of key law reform	• Criminal code is adopted	Lead: MINUSTAH Partner: Ministry of Justice and Public Security Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
		• Reform law of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and law on nationalities are adopted. Reform of civil status is initiated	Lead: MINUSTAH Partner: UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Haitian National Police Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
		• Code for the protection of children and law reforming adoption are implemented	Lead: UNICEF Partner: Ministry of Social Affairs Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
	Establishment of a constitutional council in conformity with section 190 bis of the Constitution	• Support by the United Nations for the establishment of a constitutional council	Lead: MINUSTAH Partner: UNDP, OHCHR Office of the President Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
	Improvement of the efficiency of the justice system with reduction in the amount of time needed for treatment of criminal cases and increase in number of civil and administrative cases	• In the three model jurisdictions, the number of hearings increases to 600 per year. Legal offices are functional	Lead: MINUSTAH Partner: UNDP, Ministry of Justice and Public Security and Superior Council of the Judiciary Mechanism: integrated strategic framework

Priorities	*Outcomes*	*Outputs*	*Lead, partners, mechanism*
	Improvement in the capacity of meteorological and hydrologic services to provide quality information and early warnings	• Creation of a national meteorological service with the relevant means and capacity to provide services	Lead: WMO Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
	The political environment is sufficiently stable and democratic to ensure the continuity of national institutions and greater respect for human rights	• A permanent electoral council is able to organize and coordinate the holding of transparent, fair and credible parliamentary election without the help of external partners and the security, technical and logistical support of MINUSTAH	Lead: MINUSTAH Partner: UNDP, UNICEF, UN-Women Government of Haiti Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
	Non-State organizations are gradually strengthened to represent the priorities and rights of their members, including women, at the municipal and departmental levels	• A growing number of organizations or platforms of civil society, including women's and youth associations, use rights-based advocacy tools to increase access to basic services	Lead: OHCHR Partner: MINUSTAH, UNDP, UNICEF, UN-Women, UN-Habitat Government of Haiti Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
Capacity of national institutions are reinforced to ensure security of the population throughout the entire territory	Haitian National Police increases its operational capacity	• A minimum of 15,000 police officers are in place throughout the entire territory, including 11 per cent female officers	Lead: MINUSTAH Haitian National Police Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
	Haitian National Police has the necessary administrative and operational means to provide services	• 1,000 crowd-control officers in the regions and in Port-au-Prince with a civil engineering unit capable of providing services	Lead: MINUSTAH Partner: Haitian National Police, Ministry of Justice and Public Security Mechanism: integrated strategic framework

Priorities	*Outcomes*	*Outputs*	*Lead, partners, mechanism*
	Haitian authorities, at the borders, are well-equipped and trained and in sufficient numbers, in order to increase control of migration, reduce irregular movements and illegal trafficking, while increasing collection of taxes	• Rehabilitation of customs surveillance is implemented with at least 515 agents. A technical border commission meets regularly	Lead: IOM, MINUSTAH Partner: Haitian Customs, Immigration, Haitian National Police, Prime Minister's Office Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
	Number of agents of the Haitian National Police Child Protection Brigade at border crossings increases	• At least two agents at border crossings are present and 100 per cent of cases are investigated	Lead: IOM, UNHCR Partner: Institute for Social Welfare and Research, Haitian National Police Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
	Administrative and operational capacity of the Directorate of Prison Administration is sufficient to ensure that prisons respond to international norms	• A strategic development plan is adopted and implemented	Lead: MINUSTAH Partner: Directorate of Prison Administration, Ministry of Justice and Public Security Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
		• Guidelines on mental illness in prisons are implemented by the Directorate as well as guidelines for pregnancy in prisons and breast-feeding mothers	Lead: MINUSTAH Partner: Directorate of Prison Administration, Ministry of Justice and Public Security Mechanism: integrated strategic framework
Decentralized State institutions have tools and capabilities to implement territorial development strategy in a participative and equal manner	Number of individuals recruited, trained and financed increases	• Financing of 40 technical managers is ensured by the relevant communes, with support by the State	Lead: IOM, UNDP, UNOPS, MINUSTAH Partner: Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities Mechanism: integrated strategic framework

Priorities	*Outcomes*	*Outputs*	*Lead, partners, mechanism*
	Number of communes implementing territorial development strategy increases	• At least 10 communes implement strategies	Lead: IOM, UNDP, UNOPS, MINUSTAH Partner: Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Collectivities Mechanism: integrated strategic framework

Abbreviations: IOM, International Organization for Migration; MINUSTAH, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti; OHCHR, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; UNDP, United Nations Development Programme; UN-Habitat, United Nations Human Settlements Programme; UNHCR, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UNOPS, United Nations Office for Project Services; UN-Women, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Map

MINUSTAH
February 2016
Force Headquarters
Battalion boundary
International boundary
Departmental boundary
National capital
Departmental capital
Town, village
Main road
Secondary road
Airport
HAITI
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
CUBA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
CARIBBEAN SEA
NORD - OUEST
ARTIBONITE
NORD
NORD - EST
CENTRE
OUEST
SUD - EST
GRANDE - ANSE
SUD
NIPPES
Port-de-Paix
Cap-Haïtien
Gonaïves
Saint Michel de l'Attalaye
Hinche
Jacmel
Les Cayes
Jérémie
Miragoâne
Petit Trou de Nippes
Anse-à-Veau
Port-Salut
Aquin
Jean Rabel
Môle St. Nicolas
Bombardopolis
Saint Louis du Nord
Anse-à-Foleur
Bassin Bleu
Port Margot
Plaisance
Limbé
Acul du Nord
Milot
Terrier Rouge
Ouanaminthe
Perches
Mont Organisé
Vallières
Fort Liberté
Ferrier
Trou du Nord
Caracol
Ouanaminthe
Dondon
Saint Raphaël
Pignon
Cerca la Source
Thomonde
Lascahobas
Belladère
Savanette
Comiel
Mirebalais
Boucan Carré
Saut d'Eau
Cerca Carvajal
Hinche
Maïssade
Lac de Péligre
Cange
Arcahaie
Croix des Bouquets
Tabarre
Pétion-Ville
Kenscoff
Port-au-Prince
Carrefour
Delmas
Gressier
Léogâne
Grand Goâve
Petit Goâve
Fond Parisien
Fonds Verrettes
Jacmel
Cayes-Jacmel
La Vallée de Jacmel
Bainet
Côtes de Fer
Belle Anse
Anse Rouge
Terre Neuve
Baie de Henne
Môle St. Nicolas
Baie de Port-de-Paix
Canal de la Tortue
Canal de Saint Marc
Golfe de la Gonâve
Baie de Gonâve
Baie de Petite Rivière de Nippes
Baie de Port-à-Piment
Baie des Cayes
Canal de la Gonâve
Pointe Sable
Pointe Abacou
Pointe Jean Gilles
Pointe Jérémie
Pointe Nord
Pointe Sud
Pointe Abricots
Pointe Macaya
Pointe Dame Marie
Pointe Saline
Pointe Grande Anse
Pointe Cavaillon

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General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 72
Promotion and protection of human rights

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes. The Framework is a tool to guide integrated analysis and assessment of the risk of atrocity crimes worldwide, by which I am referring to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The Framework is based on international law standards and is the result of extensive research into legislation, judicial decisions by international jurisdictions, and academic research and expertise gained by the Offices of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect. Previous drafts were submitted for review to the United Nations and academic partners and expert practitioners.

The Framework was developed in response to the following demands: (a) my predecessor's request, when launching the Plan of Action to Prevent Genocide in 2004, for guidelines on how to identify approaching signs of genocide and, consequently, other atrocity crimes; (b) requests by the Security Council to the Secretary-General to "refer to the Council information and analyses from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law", as well as "his assessment of potential threats to international peace and security", in this way contributing to the prompt consideration by the Council of early warning or prevention cases; and (c) the need for early warning assessments to be prepared in a consistent and systematic manner.

I believe that a common understanding and the systematic application of the Framework when assessing situations worldwide will increase awareness of signs of concern at an earlier stage and allow us to sound the alarm earlier and more consistently. In this regard, States must uphold the obligations established under international law to protect populations from atrocity crimes. Doing so entails identifying the risks set out in the Framework and taking timely action to address them. Member States are also encouraged to use the Framework to identify areas of

Please recycle

success as well as gaps in atrocity prevention capacities and strategies at the national level. The Framework, in short, aims at compelling Member States and other relevant actors to move from a reactive to a preventive approach in addressing serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

I am pleased to present the present Framework at a time when the United Nations is undergoing a system-wide change to the way we respond to situations where there is a risk of, or ongoing, serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. In 2013, I launched the Human Rights Up Front initiative, a major effort to implement existing prevention mandates intended to improve early warning, efficiency, support for national authorities and internal accountability. Transparency, dialogue and cooperation are the guiding principles of the initiative.

I recommend the widest possible use of this Framework by United Nations entities and the membership of the United Nations to support prevention strategies at the national, regional and international levels. Therefore, I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes

I. Introduction

A. Overview

1. The Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes[1] (hereinafter "the Framework") is a tool to guide an integrated analysis and assessment of the risk of atrocity crimes worldwide. The Framework was developed by the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect and is the result of extensive research into legislation and judicial decisions by international jurisdictions, as well as academic research and expertise gained by the Office since it was created in 2009. Earlier drafts were submitted for review to United Nations and academic partners and expert practitioners.

2. The Framework was developed in response to the following demands: (a) the request by the Secretary-General, when launching in 2004 the Action Plan to Prevent Genocide,[2] for guidelines on how to identify approaching signs of genocide and, consequently, other atrocity crimes; (b) the requests by the Security Council to the Secretary-General to "refer to the Council information and analyses from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law", as well as "his assessment of potential threats to international peace and security", in this way contributing to the Council's prompt consideration of early warning or prevention cases;[3] and (c) the need for early warning assessments delivered by the Secretary-General to be prepared in a consistent and systematic manner.

3. A previous framework of analysis was developed in 2009 by the then Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and focused on assessment of the risk of the crime of genocide. However, with the subsequent expansion of the Office's responsibilities to also support the work of the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, there was a need to develop a framework that could be used to analyse not only the risk of genocide but also the risk of crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.

4. The Framework is based on the premise that atrocity crimes are not usually single or random events. Instead, they tend to develop in a dynamic process that offers entry points for action to prevent their occurrence. If atrocity crimes are processes, it is possible to identify warning signs or indicators that they might occur. This is particularly true in the case of genocide and crimes against humanity. If root causes and precursors of these crimes are understood, and it is possible to identify risk factors that can lead to or enable their commission, it follows that it is

[1] The term "atrocity crimes" is being used to refer to three legally defined international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It has also been extended to include ethnic cleansing which, while not defined as an independent crime under international law, includes acts that are serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that may themselves amount to one of the recognized atrocity crimes.

[2] Press Release SG/SM/9197 AFR/893, HR/CN/1077 (2004).

[3] See Security Council resolutions 1366 (2001) and 2171 (2014), among others.

possible to also identify measures that can be taken by States and the international community to prevent these crimes. Therefore, while the Framework is primarily a tool for analysis and risk assessment, it has also been designed to facilitate early action.

5. A systematic application of the Framework in assessing situations worldwide will serve to increase awareness of signs of concern and to sound the alarm earlier and more consistently. States must assume their established obligation under international law to protect populations by preventing atrocity crimes before they can occur. This entails identifying risks and taking action to address them. The international community also has a responsibility in this regard. The Framework, in short, aims to encourage a preventive rather than a reactive approach.

6. The Framework of Analysis is a tool not only for United Nations officials, but also for national, regional and international actors charged with developing or managing early warning mechanisms, or other mechanisms used for monitoring, assessment and forecasting. Importantly, the Framework is a tool that Member States can use to help to identify both areas of success as well as gaps in atrocity prevention capacities and strategies at the national level.

B. Analytical tools

7. The Framework contains two main analytical tools for assessing the risk of atrocity crimes: (a) a list of 14 risk factors for atrocity crimes; and (b) indicators for each of the risk factors. Both the risk factors and the indicators reflect definitions of the crimes in international law, case law from the work of international courts or tribunals, and empirical analysis of past and present situations.

8. The Framework considers risk factors as conditions that increase the risk of or susceptibility to negative outcomes. Those identified in the Framework include behaviours, circumstances or elements that create an environment conducive to the commission of atrocity crimes, or indicate the potential, probability or risk of their occurrence. Risk factors are not all the same. Some are structural in nature, such as the weakness of State structures, while others pertain to more dynamic circumstances or events, such as triggering factors. Triggers and other dynamic elements transform general risk into an increased likelihood that atrocity crimes will be committed. The indicators included in the Framework are different manifestations of each risk factor, and therefore assist in determining the degree to which an individual risk factor is present. The particular indicators identified in the Framework have been drawn from past and current cases, but are not intended to be exhaustive.

9. Among the 14 risk factors outlined, the first eight are common to all crimes, reflecting the fact that atrocity crimes tend to occur in similar settings and share several elements or features. In addition to these, the Framework identifies six additional risk factors, two specific to each of the international crimes, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The common risk factors help us to identify the probability of atrocity crimes overall, without necessarily identifying the type of crime. The assumption is that in the initial stages of monitoring, it is not always possible to identify which specific crime is most at risk. This becomes clearer as the process leading to atrocity crimes progresses. In addition, different kinds of atrocity crimes can occur concurrently in the same situation, or one crime

might be a precursor to another form of atrocity crime. The specific risk factors, on the other hand, result from the fact that each crime has elements and precursors that are not common to all three crimes. As such, they reflect the legal definitions of the crimes, even though they are not strictly limited by them, nor intend to be criminal evidence of them.

10. Given the absence of a conceptual definition common to all war crimes, such as that which exists for genocide and crimes against humanity, the Framework focuses only on war crimes that have an impact on the protection of human life, this being the primary objective of preventive action. In addition, given the focus of the Responsibility to Protect principle on the protection of populations from the most serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, the Framework covers war crimes that assume a more systematic or widespread pattern of conduct. Finally, given that ethnic cleansing does not have a distinct legal definition as an international crime, but includes acts that can constitute other atrocity crimes or elements of them, it has been integrated into the analysis of the risk factors for those crimes.

C. Methodology

11. To be effective, assessments require the systematic collection of accurate and reliable information based on the risk factors and indicators that the Framework identifies. The earlier risk factors are identified, the greater the opportunities for early prevention. As time goes on, preventive action becomes more difficult and more costly. A few guiding principles should be considered.

12. First, not all risk factors need to be present for there to be an assessment that there is a significant risk of atrocity crimes occurring. In some situations, despite the presence of most of the risk factors, atrocity crimes might not yet have taken place. That could be owing to the absence of a triggering event or the presence of a strong mitigating factor. It may also not be possible to obtain sufficiently accurate and reliable information to confirm the presence of a particular risk factor. Nevertheless, this should not deter monitors and analysts from warning of the likelihood that an atrocity crime could be committed. Triggering factors are not always predictable and a strong mitigating factor might weaken or disappear. It is also important to bear in mind that common risk factors tend to be manifest sooner than specific risk factors. Information that confirms the presence of specific risk factors is sometimes more difficult to obtain at an early stage.

13. Second, the more risk factors (and the greater the number of relevant indicators) that are present, the greater the risk that an atrocity crime may be committed. Also, the greater the number of indicators of a particular risk factor that are present, the greater the importance and role of that factor in a particular situation. However, more than numbers, it is the dynamics and interaction among the different risk factors that increase the risk of atrocity crimes. When analysed in isolation, risk factors may become less relevant.

14. Third, the risk factors and the indicators are not ranked, as their relative importance will differ according to the particular context. Even though armed conflict has been identified as the strongest or most important contributing risk factor, armed conflict is not a precondition of all atrocity crimes: genocide and crimes against humanity can also occur in times of peace. Certainly, some risk

factors will have a greater weight than others, or will be manifest more often than others. However, all contribute to increasing the risk of atrocity crimes.

15. Finally, monitors and analysts need to be flexible when considering and weighing the risk factors and indicators in the Framework and situate them within the broader political, historical and cultural context. The particular manifestation of a risk factor may be different in different contexts, and this should therefore be taken into account during the analysis. In addition, given the development of new trends and patterns of violence and of conduct related to conflict and violence in general, assessments should be open to new elements that might surface.

D. Accuracy

16. The Framework of Analysis provides a set of elements to help monitors or analysts to make qualitative and systematic assessments of the risk of atrocity crimes in specific situations. However, the presence of risk factors of atrocity crimes in a particular situation does not directly or inevitably lead to the occurrence of those crimes — risk is not equated with inevitability. In fact, some of the risk factors identified in the Framework will be present in many situations or societies around the world where atrocity crimes have not taken place. The absence of atrocity crimes in those societies can be linked to the strength of local sources of resilience, outside assistance that mitigates risk, the lack of motivation of the leadership to commit or permit atrocity crimes, or simply the absence of a triggering factor or event. On the other hand, unpredictable occurrences can disrupt a likely course of events.

17. However, although it is impossible to draw a direct causal relation between the presence of particular risk factors and the occurrence of atrocity crimes, these crimes are rarely committed in the absence of all or most of the risk factors that the Framework identifies.

II. Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes

A. Common risk factors

Risk factor 1. Situations of armed conflict or other forms of instability

Situations that place a State under stress and generate an environment conducive to atrocity crimes

18. Atrocity crimes usually take place against a background of either an international or non-international armed conflict. Armed conflicts are periods characterized by a high incidence of violence, insecurity and the permissibility of acts that would otherwise not be acceptable. In addition, the capacity of States to inflict harm is usually at its peak during periods of conflict. If armed conflict is a violent way of dealing with problems, it is clear that the risk of atrocity crimes acutely increases during these periods.

19. However, other situations that are not typical armed conflicts can also put a State under such a level of stress that it becomes more prone to serious human rights violations and, eventually, to atrocity crimes. In fact, genocide and crimes against

humanity can also occur during times of peace. This is most likely when there are serious levels of political instability, threats to the security of the country or even volatility in economic or social affairs. Although situations of instability, or even of armed conflict, will not necessarily lead to the occurrence of atrocity crimes, they highly increase the likelihood of those crimes.

20. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 1:

(a) International or non-international armed conflict;

(b) Security crisis caused by, among other factors, defection from peace agreements, armed conflict in neighbouring countries, threats of external interventions or acts of terrorism;

(c) Humanitarian crisis or emergency, including those caused by natural disasters or epidemics;

(d) Political instability caused by abrupt or irregular regime change or transfer of power;

(e) Political instability caused by disputes over power or growing nationalist, armed or radical opposition movements;

(f). Political tension caused by autocratic regimes or severe political repression;

(g) Economic instability caused by scarcity of resources or disputes over their use or exploitation;

(h) Economic instability caused by severe crisis in the national economy;

(i) Economic instability caused by acute poverty, mass unemployment or deep horizontal inequalities;

(j) Social instability caused by resistance to, or mass protests against, State authority or policies;

(k) Social instability caused by exclusion or tensions based on identity issues, their perception or extremist forms.

Risk factor 2. Record of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law

Past or current serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, particularly if assuming an early pattern of conduct, and including those amounting to atrocity crimes, that have not been prevented, punished or adequately addressed and, as a result, create a risk of further violations

21. Societies that have a history of violence and serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law or atrocity crimes, or where these are currently taking place, can be more prone to further atrocity crimes. As history has demonstrated, atrocity crimes in general and genocide in particular are preceded by less widespread or systematic serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. These are typically violations of civil and political rights, but they may include also severe restrictions to economic, social and cultural rights, often linked to patterns of discrimination or exclusion of protected groups, populations or individuals.

22. The above-mentioned risk factor is also relevant where the legacies of past atrocity crimes have not been adequately addressed through individual criminal accountability, reparation, truth-seeking and reconciliation processes, as well as comprehensive reform measures in the security and judicial sectors. A society in this situation is more likely to resort again to violence as a form of addressing problems.

23. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 2:

(a) Past or present serious restrictions to or violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, particularly if assuming an early pattern of conduct and if targeting protected groups, populations or individuals;

(b) Past acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or their incitement;

(c) Policy or practice of impunity for or tolerance of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, of atrocity crimes, or of their incitement;

(d) Inaction, reluctance or refusal to use all possible means to stop planned, predictable or ongoing serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law or likely atrocity crimes, or their incitement;

(e) Continuation of support to groups accused of involvement in serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including atrocity crimes, or failure to condemn their actions;

(f) Justification, biased accounts or denial of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law or atrocity crimes;

(g) Politicization or absence of reconciliation or transitional justice processes following conflict;

(h) Widespread mistrust in State institutions or among different groups as a result of impunity.

Risk factor 3. Weakness of State structures

Circumstances that negatively affect the capacity of a State to prevent or halt atrocity crimes

24. The risk of atrocity crimes can be increased by a State's lack of capacity to prevent those crimes. A State protects its population through the establishment of frameworks and institutions that are guided by the rule of law and principles of good governance. However, when such structures are inadequate or simply do not exist, the ability of the State to prevent atrocity crimes is significantly diminished. As a consequence, populations are left vulnerable to those who may take advantage of the limitations or the dysfunction of State machinery, or to those that may opt for violence to respond to real or perceived threats.

25. The above is even more the case in a situation of armed conflict, when it is paramount that those resorting to the use of force are fully aware of and respect the rules that aim to protect populations from such force, and have the necessary means to do so. The weakness of State structures will not necessarily be a cause of atrocity crimes, but it undoubtedly decreases the level of protection and, when analysed in conjunction with other risk factors, increases the probability of atrocity crimes.

26. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 3:

(a) National legal framework that does not offer ample and effective protection, including through ratification and domestication of relevant international human rights and humanitarian law treaties;

(b) National institutions, particularly judicial, law enforcement and human rights institutions that lack sufficient resources, adequate representation or training;

(c) Lack of an independent and impartial judiciary;

(d) Lack of effective civilian control of security forces;

(e) High levels of corruption or poor governance;

(f) Absence or inadequate external or internal mechanisms of oversight and accountability, including those where victims can seek recourse for their claims;

(g) Lack of awareness of and training on international human rights and humanitarian law to military forces, irregular forces and non-State armed groups, or other relevant actors;

(h) Lack of capacity to ensure that means and methods of warfare comply with international humanitarian law standards;

(i) Lack of resources for reform or institution-building, including through regional or international support;

(j) Insufficient resources to implement overall measures aimed at protecting populations.

Risk factor 4. Motives or incentives

Reasons, aims or drivers that justify the use of violence against protected groups, populations or individuals, including by actors outside of State borders

27. The motives or incentives that lead perpetrators to commit atrocity crimes are not elements of the legal definition of those crimes and are therefore not relevant to determine individual criminal responsibility. However, from an early warning perspective, it is extremely important to be able to identify motivations, aims or drivers that could influence certain individuals or groups to resort to massive violence as a way to achieve goals, feed an ideology or respond to real or perceived threats. On one hand, to do so allows for a higher degree of prediction of the likelihood of those crimes. On the other hand, it opens the opportunity to develop prevention strategies aimed at neutralizing or curbing those motives or incentives.

28. No one specific motive or incentive will automatically lead to atrocity crimes, but certain motives or incentives are more likely to, especially those that are based on exclusionary ideology, which is revealed in the construction of identities in terms of "us" and "them" to accentuate differences. The historical, political, economic or even cultural environment in which such ideologies develop can also be relevant.

29. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 4:

(a) Political motives, particularly those aimed at the attainment or consolidation of power;

(b) Economic interests, including those based on the safeguard and well-being of elites or identity groups, or control over the distribution of resources;

(c) Strategic or military interests, including those based on protection or seizure of territory and resources;

(d) Other interests, including those aimed at rendering an area homogeneous in its identity;

(e) Real or perceived threats posed by protected groups, populations or individuals against interests or objectives of perpetrators, including perceptions of disloyalty to a cause;

(f) Real or perceived membership of or support for armed opposition groups by protected groups, populations or individuals;

(g) Ideologies based on the supremacy of a certain identity or on extremist versions of identity;

(h) Politicization of past grievances, tensions or impunity;

(i) Social trauma caused by past incidents of violence not adequately addressed and that produced feelings of loss, displacement, injustice and a possible desire for revenge.

Risk factor 5. Capacity to commit atrocity crimes

Conditions that indicate the ability of relevant actors to commit atrocity crimes

30. Atrocity crimes are not easy to commit. In particular, genocide and crimes against humanity, but also several war crimes, are characterized by large-scale violence that requires a level of planning and that, in most cases, is sustained over a period of time. To be able to engage in such conduct, actors aiming at committing atrocity crimes must have at their disposal the necessary substantial resources and support, either internal or external. That capacity can be intentionally developed or it can also be incidental. Accordingly, the fact that States or groups have the capacity to perpetrate atrocity crimes does not imply that they will commit them; for that, it is also necessary that they have the intention to make use of that capacity against a protected group, population or individual. Therefore, this risk factor must be assessed in conjunction with other factors.

31. In contrast, those who do not have the capacity to commit atrocity crimes, i.e., where one or more of the indicators mentioned below are not present, will most likely not be able to put any plan into action, or will face serious challenges in their attempt to implement it.

32. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 5:

(a) Availability of personnel and of arms and ammunition, or of the financial resources, public or private, for their procurement;

(b) Capacity to transport and deploy personnel and to transport and distribute arms and ammunition;

(c) Capacity to encourage or recruit large numbers of supporters from populations or groups, and availability of the means to mobilize them;

(d) Strong culture of obedience to authority and group conformity;

(e) Presence of or links with other armed forces or with non-State armed groups;

(f) Presence of commercial actors or companies that can serve as enablers by providing goods, services, or other forms of practical or technical support that help to sustain perpetrators;

(g) Financial, political or other support of influential or wealthy national actors;

(h) Armed, financial, logistic, training or other support of external actors, including States, international or regional organizations, private companies, or others.

Risk factor 6. Absence of mitigating factors

Absence of elements that, if present, could contribute to preventing or to lessening the impact of serious acts of violence against protected groups, populations or individuals

33. Atrocity crimes result from a convergence of elements, as demonstrated in the present Framework. Among those elements, some point more directly to the likelihood of atrocity crimes, while others might have a more indirect effect and seem secondary, or even too broad to merit consideration. However, even if indirect, those elements can contribute to preventing an escalation of violence or even to ending it and can therefore reduce the probability of atrocity crimes. Some of those elements can exist prior to the development of tensions, crises or conflict, while others can arise as a situation escalates. Such elements, either internal or external, are important to consider for early warning purposes.

34. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 6:

(a) Limited or lack of empowerment processes, resources, allies or other elements that could contribute to the ability of protected groups, populations or individuals to protect themselves;

(b) Lack of a strong, organized and representative national civil society and of a free, diverse and independent national media;

(c) Lack of interest and focus of international civil society actors or of access to international media;

(d) Lack of, or limited presence of, the United Nations, international non-governmental organizations or other international or regional actors in the country and with access to populations;

(e) Lack of membership and effective participation of the State in international or regional organizations that establish mandatory membership obligations;

(f) Lack of exposure, openness or establishment of political or economic relations with other States or organizations;

(g) Limited cooperation of the State with international and regional human rights mechanisms;

(h) Lack of incentives or willingness of parties to a conflict to engage in dialogue, make concessions and receive support from the international community;

(i) Lack of interest, reluctance or failure of States Members of the United Nations or members of international or regional organizations to support a State to

exercise its responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes, or to take action when the State manifestly fails that responsibility;

(j) Lack of support by neighbouring States to protect populations at risk and in need of refuge, including by closure of borders, forced repatriation or aid restriction;

(k) Lack of an early warning mechanism relevant to the prevention of atrocity crimes.

Risk factor 7. Enabling circumstances or preparatory action

Events or measures, whether gradual or sudden, which provide an environment conducive to the commission of atrocity crimes, or which suggest a trajectory towards their perpetration

35. Atrocity crimes, and in particular genocide and crimes against humanity, are processes that take time to plan, coordinate and implement. They cannot be explained as isolated or spontaneous events that perpetrators decided to commit without some level of preparation. Also, as mentioned in a previous risk factor, perpetrators need to possess sufficient resources to be able to commit massive or widespread acts of violence. Such resources are not always readily available and can take time to assemble. Consequently, throughout the development of these processes, it should be possible to identify events, actions or changes that point to the likelihood that certain actors are taking steps towards a scenario of mass violence and possibly atrocity crimes. Alternatively, such events, actions or changes can also serve to create an environment that favours or even encourages the commission of such crimes. Recognizing such indicators and establishing a causal link to the probability of atrocity crimes is not always easy, but it is of great relevance. As with all risk factors, analysis of this risk factor should take into consideration a context in which other risk factors might also be present.

36. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 7:

(a) Imposition of emergency laws or extraordinary security measures that erode fundamental rights;

(b) Suspension of or interference with vital State institutions, or measures that result in changes in their composition or balance of power, particularly if this results in the exclusion or lack of representation of protected groups;

(c) Strengthening of the security apparatus, its reorganization or mobilization against protected groups, populations or individuals;

(d) Acquisition of large quantities of arms and ammunition or of other objects that could be used to inflict harm;

(e) Creation of, or increased support to, militia or paramilitary groups;

(f) Imposition of strict control on the use of communication channels, or banning access to them;

(g) Expulsion or refusal to allow the presence of non-governmental organizations, international organizations, media or other relevant actors, or imposition of severe restrictions on their services and movements;

(h) Increased violations of the right to life, physical integrity, liberty or security of members of protected groups, populations or individuals, or recent

adoption of measures or legislation that affect or deliberately discriminate against them;

(i) Increased serious acts of violence against women and children, or creation of conditions that facilitate acts of sexual violence against those groups, including as a tool of terror;

(j) Imposition of life-threatening living conditions or the deportation, seizure, collection, segregation, evacuation or forced displacement or transfer of protected groups, populations or individuals to camps, rural areas, ghettos or other assigned locations;

(k) Destruction or plundering of essential goods or installations for protected groups, populations or individuals, or of property related to cultural and religious identity;

(l) Marking of people or their property based on affiliation to a group;

(m) Increased politicization of identity, past events or motives to engage in violence;

(n) Increased inflammatory rhetoric, propaganda campaigns or hate speech targeting protected groups, populations or individuals.

Risk factor 8. Triggering factors

Events or circumstances that, even if seemingly unrelated to atrocity crimes, may seriously exacerbate existing conditions or may spark their onset

37. The dynamics of atrocity crimes are not the same in all cases. In fact, they can vary considerably. The commission of atrocity crimes may progress at a faster pace if the perpetrators have a clear plan and the immediate capacity to implement it. In other situations, the commission of atrocity crimes might unfold at a late stage of a situation of serious crisis or tension that may have been lasting for a long period of time. It can also happen that unpredictable events or circumstances aggravate conditions or spark a sudden deterioration in a situation, prompting the perpetration of atrocity crimes. An adequate early warning assessment should be mindful of all such events or circumstances and consider their potential impact, even if they appear to be unrelated to more direct or structural risk factors.

38. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 8:

(a) Sudden deployment of security forces or commencement of armed hostilities;

(b) Spillover of armed conflicts or serious tensions in neighbouring countries;

(c) Measures taken by the international community perceived as threatening to a State's sovereignty;

(d) Abrupt or irregular regime changes, transfers of power, or changes in political power of groups;

(e) Attacks against the life, physical integrity, liberty or security of leaders, prominent individuals or members of opposing groups; other serious acts of violence, such as terrorist attacks;

(f) Religious events or real or perceived acts of religious intolerance or disrespect, including outside national borders;

(g) Acts of incitement or hate propaganda targeting particular groups or individuals;

(h) Census, elections, pivotal activities related to those processes, or measures that destabilize them;

(i) Sudden changes that affect the economy or the workforce, including as a result of financial crises, natural disasters or epidemics;

(j) Discovery of natural resources or launching of exploitation projects that have a serious impact on the livelihoods and sustainability of groups or civilian populations;

(k) Commemoration events of past crimes or of traumatic or historical episodes that can exacerbate tensions between groups, including the glorification of perpetrators of atrocities;

(l) Acts related to accountability processes, particularly when perceived as unfair.

B. Specific risk factors

Risk factor 9. (Genocide) Intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups[4]

Past or present conduct that reveals serious prejudice against protected groups and that creates stress in the relationship among groups or with the State, generating an environment conducive to atrocity crimes

39. Genocide is an extreme form of identity-based crime. Whether real or socially constructed, identity can be subject to manipulation by elites, including as a deliberate tactic for personal or political gain, and may be used to deepen societal divisions. Identity-based conflict, which may give rise to the crime as defined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, can be rooted in differences between national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, whether real or perceived. It can also be rooted in other differences, such as those of a political or even geographical nature, that eventually develop along national, ethnical, racial or religious lines.

40. However, the risk factor is not the existence of diversity within the population of a country, nor is it those differences per se that cause conflict between groups. Instead, it is discrimination based on such differences, and persistent patterns of it, that establish divisions within society which serve as both a material cause and a perceived justification of group violence. Without group-level discrimination, even deep-seated grievances are unlikely to transform into the patterns of abuse that give rise to genocide.

41. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 9:

(a) Past or present serious discriminatory, segregational, restrictive or exclusionary practices, policies or legislation against protected groups;

[4] "Protected group" within the context of the present Framework means any of the groups protected by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, article 2.

(b) Denial of the existence of protected groups or of recognition of elements of their identity;

(c) History of atrocity crimes committed with impunity against protected groups;

(d) Past or present serious tensions or conflicts between protected groups or with the State, with regard to access to rights and resources, socioeconomic disparities, participation in decision-making processes, security, expressions of group identity, or to perceptions about the targeted group;

(e) Past or present serious tensions or conflicts involving other types of groups (political, social, cultural, geographical, etc.) that could develop along national, ethnical, racial or religious lines;

(f) Lack of national mechanisms or initiatives to deal with identity-based tensions or conflict.

Risk factor 10. (Genocide) Signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group

Facts or circumstances that suggest an intent, by action or omission, to destroy all or part of a protected group based on its national, ethnical, racial or religious identity, or the perception of this identity

42. The intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group is both one of the most fundamental and one of the most difficult elements of the crime of genocide to prove. It is also a challenging element to predict from an early warning perspective. Frequently, the intent only comes to light after a crime has taken place, typically during accountability processes, or sometimes when it might be too late to take preventive action owing to the advanced level of the violence.

43. However, there are some early indicators that can serve as a warning sign. Those indicators are unlikely to be explicit, but they can also be inferred from conduct that would reasonably lead to the belief, even if not the certainty, that the intent of or a plan for annihilation could exist. Indicators can include overt methods of destruction, or otherwise covert or indirect methods that in practice lead to the same ultimate result. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element. As genocide is not a spontaneous act, it is unlikely that it will be committed in the absence of such a plan or policy.

44. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 10:

(a) Official documents, political manifestos, media records or any other documentation through which a direct intent, or incitement, to target a protected group is revealed, or can be inferred in a way that the implicit message could reasonably lead to acts of destruction against that group;

(b) Targeted physical elimination, rapid or gradual, of members of a protected group, including only selected parts of it, which could bring about the destruction of the group;

(c) Widespread or systematic discriminatory or targeted practices or violence against the lives, freedom or physical and moral integrity of a protected group, even if not yet reaching the level of elimination;

(d) Development of policies or measures that seriously affect the reproductive rights of women, or that contemplate the separation or forcible transfer of children belonging to protected groups;

(e) Resort to methods or practices of violence that are particularly harmful against or that dehumanize a protected group, that reveal an intention to cause humiliation, fear or terror to fragment the group, or that reveal an intention to change its identity;

(f) Resort to means of violence that are particularly harmful or prohibited under international law, including prohibited weapons, against a protected group;

(g) Expressions of public euphoria at having control over a protected group and its existence;

(h) Attacks against or destruction of homes, farms, businesses or other livelihoods of a protected group and/or of their cultural or religious symbols and property.

Risk factor 11. (Crimes against humanity) Signs of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population

Signs of violent conduct including, but not limited to, attacks involving the use of force, against any civilian population and that suggest massive, large-scale and frequent violence (widespread), or violence with patterns of periodicity, similitude and organization (systematic)

45. Crimes against humanity involve either large-scale violence (quantitative element) or a methodical type of violence (qualitative element). This excludes random, accidental or isolated acts of violence that, in addition, could be difficult to predict. Instead, the type of violence that characterizes crimes against humanity will most probably require a level of preparation that can be revealed through different indicators. Such indicators can, for example, relate to the means and methods used to engage in violence, or to patterns of violent conduct during the early stages of a conflict that can help to predict an aggravation of those patterns and, consequently, the potential for crimes against humanity. Other indicators can point to patterns of conduct — even outside of a conflict situation — that manifest earlier, such as the building up of capacity for large-scale or systematic violence, or the use of alternative means to target civilian populations or particular groups within them. Identifying early stages of pattern manifestation is crucial to be able to devise strategies to stop them.

46. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 11:

(a) Signs of patterns of violence against civilian populations, or against members of an identifiable group, their property, livelihoods and cultural or religious symbols;

(b) Increase in the number of civilian populations or the geographical area targeted, or in the number, types, scale or gravity of violent acts committed against civilian populations;

(c) Increase in the level of organization or coordination of violent acts and weapons used against a civilian population;

(d) Use of the media or other means to provoke or incite to violent acts;

(e) Signs of a plan or policy to conduct attacks against civilian populations;

(f) Establishment of new political or military structures that could be used to commit violent acts;

(g) Access to or increasing use of significant public or private resources for military or belligerent action, including the acquisition of large quantities of weaponry or other instruments that can cause death or serious harm;

(h) Signs of development or increased use of means or methods of violence that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets or that are capable of mass destruction, persecution or weakening of communities.

Risk factor 12. (Crimes against humanity) Signs of a plan or policy to attack any civilian population

Facts or evidence suggestive of a State or organizational policy, even if not explicitly stipulated or formally adopted, to commit serious acts of violence directed against any civilian population

47. In addition to the requirement that attacks against the civilian population be widespread or systematic, crimes against humanity are committed in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit an attack. Even though this is not included in the definition of the crime under article 7, paragraph 1, of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 7, paragraph 2 (a), of the same document introduces this element. The plan or policy does not need to be explicitly stipulated or formally adopted and can, therefore, be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. Early signs of those circumstances, such as the indicators mentioned above, reveal planning, promotion or encouragement of violent acts, even if not explicitly presented as such. Conduct that manifests as widespread or systematic, as described in the previous risk factor, can be an indication of a plan or policy. On the other hand, a plan or policy can point to the systematic nature of an attack. The distinction between both might not always be clear.

48. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 12:

(a) Official documents, political manifestos, media records, or any other documentation through which the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy to target civilian populations or protected groups is directly revealed, or could be inferred;

(b) Adoption of discriminatory security procedures against different groups of the civilian population;

(c) Adoption of measures that result in the alteration of the ethnic, religious, racial or political composition of the overall population, including in defined geographical areas;

(d) Establishment of parallel institutions or autonomous political or military structures, or organization of a network of potential perpetrators belonging to a specific ethnic, religious, national, racial or political group;

(e) Preparation and use of significant public or private resources, whether military or other kinds;

(f) Access to and use of weaponry or other instruments not easily obtained inside the country;

(g) Preparation or mobilization of armed forces en masse against civilian populations;

(h) Facilitating or inciting violence against the civilian population or protected groups, or tolerance or deliberate failure to take action, with the aim of encouraging violent acts;

(i) Widespread or systematic violence against civilian populations or protected groups, including only parts of them, as well as on their livelihoods, property or cultural manifestations;

(j) Involvement of State institutions or high-level political or military authorities in violent acts.

Risk factor 13. (War crimes) Serious threats to those protected under international humanitarian law

Conflict-related conduct that seriously threatens the life and physical integrity of those protected under international humanitarian law

49. In contrast to the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, war crimes must always take place in the context of an armed conflict. Consequently, indicators specific to war crimes surface at a late stage, when options for prevention are more limited. For earlier preventive action, common risk factors should be considered first. However, even if a conflict is already under way, there are still measures that can be taken to diminish the effects of hostilities and, therefore, to prevent war crimes. The list of war crimes is long and each has a specific definition. They can also vary according to different norms of international law. The indicators identified above attempt to include indicators relevant to as many war crimes as possible that are related to the protection of human life. However, they are far from exhaustive. Some of the indicators identified can also on their own be war crimes, such as attacks against civilian property, which can point to an increase in the threat to human life.

50. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 13:

(a) Fragmentation of parties to the conflict or disintegration or absence of chains of command within them;

(b) Mistrust between opposing parties based on past or present breaches of commitments or agreements;

(c) Increased radicalization or extremism of opposing parties within a conflict;

(d) Promotion of ethnicity or religion as a determinant of national allegiance or allegiance to a party of the conflict;

(e) Conduct that dehumanizes the enemy or particular groups within the population, or that exhibits disrespect for their religious, ethnic or, in general, cultural traditions, morals and values, objects or institutions;

(f) Adoption of measures that severely curtail the rights of those protected under international humanitarian law, including those aligned or perceived as aligned with opposing parties but taking no active part in hostilities;

(g) Evidence of plans or discourse which reveals a threat of or incitement to violence against those protected under international humanitarian law, including as a means to spread terror, intimidate, demoralize, show military strength, provoke displacement, or as preliminary to further violence;

(h) Evidence of conduct interfering with or impeding delivery or access to supplies, facilities, equipment, objects or medical or humanitarian support indispensable to the survival of those protected under international humanitarian law;

(i) Evidence of preparation of personnel and logistics enabling the transportation, movement or confinement of large numbers of people, or the conducting of medical experiments;

(j) Evidence of conduct related to the planning, development, production, storage, acquisition, availability or threat of use of weapons, projectiles, materials or substances which are by their nature indiscriminate or cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering to people, or that can cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment;

(k) Refusal to allow inspections by competent and independent bodies into allegations of conduct included in (j) above, or action to stop such conduct;

(l) Refusal to acknowledge detentions or places of detention or to allow visits by delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross;

(m) Issuance of rules of engagement or legislation that allow the disproportionate or indiscriminate use of force, or failure to take action to avoid launching such attacks or to conduct military operations in heavily populated areas or to non-military targets;

(n) Increase in the number of any of the attacks or operations mentioned in (m) above;

(o) Use of methods of warfare that reveal treachery, including taking advantage of the symbols or emblems of humanitarian or peacekeeping personnel, or not wearing uniforms or distinctive combat gear to portray combatants as civilians;

(p) Threats or appropriation, seizure, pillaging or intentional destruction or damage of civilian objects or property that belong, represent or are part of the cultural, social or religious identity of those protected under international humanitarian law, unless used for military purposes;

(q) Threats or orders of warfare without concessions or where there would be no survivors;

(r) Conduct that threatens the rule of law or any other measures that limit protection of the rights to life and physical integrity afforded by applicable international humanitarian law, including denial of its applicability.

Risk factor 14. (War crimes) Serious threats to humanitarian or peacekeeping operations

Conflict-related conduct that threatens the protection provided by international humanitarian law to humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping personnel not taking direct part in hostilities

51. International humanitarian law affords specific protection to those working for humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions in a setting of armed conflict, as long as they do not take direct part in hostilities, except for self-defence. These operations are particularly exposed to the violence that accompanies periods of conflict owing to the key role they play in the protection of human lives and the alleviation of human suffering during those periods. A set of specific indicators can help in assessing the likelihood of attacks against this group that could constitute war crimes. As the focus of the Framework is the protection of human life, attacks against property of humanitarian or peacekeeping operations have been included only as indicators of an increased risk to the lives of their staff.

52. The following are non-exhaustive indicators of the presence of risk factor 14:

(a) Perceptions of partiality or political interference by humanitarian or peacekeeping operations, their members, the broader international community, international, regional or national organizations, individual countries, or others sponsoring or participating in the operations;

(b) Increase in identity-based conflicts and perceptions about humanitarian or peacekeeping operations as associated with the opponent or as an obstacle to plans of elimination, marginalization or displacement;

(c) Increased intensity of the conflict and scarcity of livelihoods or other resources;

(d) Fragmentation of parties to the conflict or disintegration of chains of command within them;

(e) Interference, limitation or prohibition of access or movement of humanitarian or peacekeeping operations or their personnel;

(f) Tampering with or removal of signs identifying protected objects or locations where humanitarian or peacekeeping operations are stationed or providing support;

(g) Incidents of improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the United Nations and the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions;

(h) Attacks against locations in close proximity to humanitarian or peacekeeping operations and personnel, or on the routes taken by them during their activities;

(i) Discourse or evidence of plans that suggest a threat, or the incitement or tolerance of acts of violence against humanitarian or peacekeeping operations and personnel;

(j) Disrespect, threats or increase in attacks to objects, property or persons using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions or of other humanitarian or peacekeeping operations.